Product Description
Fascinating, accessible introduction to enormously important intellectual system with numerous applications to social, economic, political problems. Newly revised edition offers overview of game theory, then lucid coverage of the two-person zero-sum game with equilibrium points; the general, two-person zero-sum game; utility theory; other topics. Problems at start of each chapter. Foreword to First Edition by Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliography.
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Customer Reviews (16)

Hit and miss
The chapter on Zero-Sum game is excellent.However, when it comes to non-zero-sum games, it becomes very confusing.The examples, and the characters in the examples are inconsistent and confusing.

Hubby is learning lots
Got this for hubby for his b-day off his wish list and well he loves it.Says he is learning a lot! Did tell me it was a tough read but still learning from it.

Optimax solution (for me)
This is my "Goldilocks/Babybear" game theory book.Not too hard, not to soft, just right.

Without calculus, Davis provides a complete introduction to an arcane but useful mathematical discipline.The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy by Williams was too soft.It used the simplest possible methods to address the concepts being discussed, and barely acknowledged some of the most interesting topics in game theory.Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey by Luce and Raiffa was good, up until you hit the calculus (pretty quickly in each chapter), after which I have no basis to form an opinion.

Davis hits all the important concepts of game theory without resorting to sigma notation or even more occult symbols (unlike Luce and Raiffa).He does, however, require a fairly solid understanding of algebra, (unlike Williams).With this fairly humble prerequisite knowledge, Davis takes the non-mathematician where he or she needs to go, and provides a fairly complete level of understanding.

I would recommend this one as a perfect sequel to Williams, should the reader not be challenged, or as a stand-alone for the marginally mathematically literate (such as myself) who need a practical understanding of mathematically grounded decision making.

E. M. Van Court

great
it was received in ample time for school and in great condition
a pleasure to work with
thanks so much

Good Entry point.Well Written.
The book is very well written, and surprisingly easy to read, considering how dry the subject matter can be at times.Gives a very nice introduction to the topic, and finishes off with a more formal discussion of some advanced topics.

If you are a mathematician, this book is probably excruciatingly easy for you, and probably has little academic value.But, if you are a layman, with an interest in systems and games, it really gives you a lot to think about, and a new way to think about it.It introduces a method of determining possible outcomes, as well as giving a nice overview of more sophisticated concepts, should you decide to explore the topic more fully.

Each chapter begins with some questions to consider while reading, and detailed answers to help at the back of each chapter.The only real issue I found with the book is that the questions are missing from chapter one, yet the answers are there.Odd. ... Read more

Product Description
This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (31)

sweet
This is a very short textbook suitable for the first course in Game Theory. All the fundamental games are clearly covered. Highly recommended.

one of good books to start game theory
I think it is a good book to know about game theory.

But for asians, some sentences are somewhat hard to understand clearly.

So my friends and I spent a little time to understand clearly.

However, it is a good book because it has plenty of examples.

Don't try to know all the examples. Picking some examples is a better way

for starters to understand and study game theory

Review
I wouldn't know anything about this item because it never arrived (even after I paid expedited shipping.) Further, I wasn't able to obtain a refund. Thanks Amazon.

Never Buy from This Seller
It is pretty simple. The item never arrived after a month and never had any contact from the seller despite attempts to make contact.I had to contact the Credit Card company to get my money back.Avoid at all costs.

A concise primer for undergrads
This is a nice book on game theory if you're not very mathematically inclined. It was recommended as a supplementary text for a graduate-level course that I took, and I enjoyed it as such. But for a more thorough introductory text for undergrads, I strongly recommend Osborne's An Introduction to Game Theory. This one is preferable only if you're allergic to rudimentary set theory. ... Read more

Product Description

Customer Reviews (24)

Bet you don't know you use it every day.
OK, everyone hates math. Everyone likes games. This is the basics of game theory. If you are trying to do better in your job, school, beat someone on the field of play or just grocery shopping, you are using game theory. Start with this one then try "The Art of Stragegy" by Avinash Dixet and Barry Nalebuff.

Very good, with practical applications
The author does an excellent job at presenting complex topics in a manner that you can either understand at a high level, or he also provides sidebars so that you can understand the mathematics of the conclusion.The author presents topics that are useful to everyday life, and can make you a better decision maker.What could be presented in a very dry manner, is instead presented with a nice touch of humor.

Boring, not applicable, and written by a 3rd grader
I found the book to be informing about game theory in the first few chapters, but after that it got completely worthless.What I learned in the first three chapters could was great, as it was basic game theorem related to everday life.As the book wore on though the author brought up a number of topics that are of no relevance to use in an everyday life.The stories are boring and the writing looks like that which should be read by pre-pubescent children.Save yourself some time and don't buy this book.You can learn 5x more by merely reading the wiki page on game theory!

Game theory should not be in the title
This book is not about game theory. The author touches on the subject for the first few chapters and then goes on to simplify it to the point of distortion and fill this book with pop-science fluff.

For a much better book on the topic, try The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy It's put out by Rand, and it looks like it would be really dry, but it's the best intro to game theory that I've read- it's easy to understand, helpful, and even a bit funny in a playful way.

If you know even the slightest bit about game theory, don't bother
This book is a very, very elementary introduction to game theory. If you know anything about game theory at all, expect to get very bored, very fast reading this book. As another reviewer wrote, it is heavy on fluff, and light on actual theory/math/science, so if you are looking for a book that will make you think, this is not it. ... Read more

Product Description

Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

Customer Reviews (13)

Competent textbook
This is a very good game theory textbook, but has some small flaws, with I would put into more detail later. The author is one of the most important game theorists of your time, and received the Nobel prize himself in 2007, however although he is an excellent theorist, his pedagogical skills are still imperfect.

I didn't read the entire book, but only the first 400 pages, so I don't hold the best position to evaluate this book compared to some readers here, with had almost memorized the book for their game theory courses. But I think that I am still qualified enough to talk about some details of the first 7 chapters of the book. One with left me a bit puzzled: Myerson said that the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem converges in the limit to the competitive equilibrium type of efficiency when the number of players is multiplied, or at least argues that modern game theory helps to explain how such equilibrium can be reached, that is true, but his example is not adequate for this argument because competitive general equilibrium has some very important differences from a trading mechanism involving units of indivisible goods with infinite players. In this case (the mechanism) we have efficiency because a continuum of players of the same set of types makes a probability distribution of valuation turn into a certainty about the valuation of the group of individuals. The classical general equilibrium case is demonstrated by game theory as an special case of cooperative games with perfect information, divisible goods and an infinite number of players of each type, where are allocation that is not consistent with classical GE is outside the core. So, his comparison in that section is really incorrect: There is no direct connection between classical GE and that type of mechanism design problem.

But other than this case, I couldn't find any flaws in the book and the clarity of "Myersonian writing" is good enough for me. Also, the math is not very advanced, but requires a good grasp of calculus and linear algebra, with many undergraduate students don't have.

Good Stuff
This is good reading if you don't spend your leisure time playing a lot of games. And it helps if you watch The Teaching Company DVD of the same name while you are reading it.

The bayesan applications of game theory
This book treats all the principal arguments of actual game theory. But particullary it studies the Bayes theorem. The importance of this fact is known also in biology and in the information theory. The tree strategies have the possibility to converge at equilibria. Myerson analyses the method for stabilizing also random subcessions.

Great Book
This book is highly recommended for those starting in game theory and need its mathematical background.
It covers everything it should in a concise and accurate way. It is not for thosenot interested in the math underlying the theory.
If your choice is between Myerson's, and Rubinstein and Osborne's "A course in Game Theory", I would choose Myerson's for a first course, it's more detailed and therefore better for self study.

Great Textbook On Game Theory
This is a great book, containing an incredible wealth of knowledge. It's all explained very well, by one of the premier game theory experts in the world (who also won the Nobel Prize, by the way). I'm not surprised at all to see that this book has been reviewed by several Ph D students.

The only problem is that it's a difficult read. Don't be fooled by the word "introduction" in the description: this book is packed with mathematics, and is written in a very dense, academic style. If you want a more lighthearted introduction to game theory, without all the equations, I highly recommend "Thinking Strategically" by Dixit and Nalebuff. It may not be quite as substantive as this tome, but it's a much better choice for the semi-casual reader. ... Read more

Product Description
"Both broad and deep, this book belongs on the shelf of every seriousstudent of game theory."-- David Kreps, Graduate School of Business,Stanford University "Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediateand important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduatelevel. Not only does it cover most of the central topics innoncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a bookin this area could hope to be." -- Charles Wilson, Professor ofEconomics, New York University

This text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory --including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, extensive-form games,subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information-- in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students withthe broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining whatthey need to know at any given point. The analytic material isaccompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. Although gametheory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus onthe kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study ofeconomic problems. They also include some applications to politicalscience. Game Theory can be used for a first or second course. Itpresents subgame perfection and Bayesian games with a minimum of detailwith technical subtleties included in the advanced sections and usesmarkers to indicate the suitability of various sections to differentaudiences. The book is divided into five parts: static games of completeinformation, dynamic games of complete information, static games ofincomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, andadvanced topics. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (9)

Outstanding reference and textbook in Game Theory
This is probably the best reference in game theory out there, and it also does a very good job in explaining difficult concepts. I've been studying from this book by my own and I'm very happy with it. I recommend it for anyone who is serious about learning game theory.

Classic Book
If that is supposed to be your text book, then fine. Otherwise, I would not spend money on it. For the purposes of learning Game Theory overall there are many better sources. This book is too old, to my mind.

An Essential Book
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf.It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to.I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural.Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. and occassionaly I have found myself wishing for a bit more technical detail, for example on Bayesian Games.But at some stage, if you do enough game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.

An Essential Book
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf.It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to.I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural.Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc.But at some stage, if you do enogh game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.

Good book
It's a good book. But it needs some preminary work before read this book. ... Read more

Product Description
"I recommend this book highly, it is beautifully done..." -- RobertAumann, Hebrew University

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at alevel suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates,emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basicconcepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs ofresults, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the materialin order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games,extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfectinformation, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises. Moreabout this book ... Read more

Customer Reviews (15)

A course in game theory
This is book is very well written and easy to read and follow (Atleast for me, I have a masters and have done some research on game theory). It is not too mathematical.

Repeated games and bargaining.
The game theory is separated by repeated game (case non-cooperative ) and cooperative game. The last model is reduced to general equilibrium studied by Walras and Arrow. It exists an other case which have aspects of all two theories, the Nash bargaining.

Not as good as Osborne's solo effort
Ten years after this good came out, Osborne wrote An Introduction to Game Theory, a more comprehensive and focused book that also takes a more leisurely pace and provides more concrete problems. Some have said that this book is better suited to graduate students, while "An Introduction" is more appropriate to undergrads. Speaking as someone who's taken game theory at both an undergraduate and graduate level, I don't see any advantage to this book in either context. It is concise, yes, but it is also dense and suffers from the authors' disagreements over several fundamental issues.

If you are looking for an advanced textbook in game theory, then I'd strongly recommend Ken Binmore's recent effort, Playing for Real. It's wide-ranging and rich in challenging problems.

Introductory course, but tough
If you are seriously interested in Game Theory, this is definitely a good book. Don't expect a light-reading, dummies oriented book.

Review for Game Theory book.
The book is not that good for learning, notation very confused and the examples are not very good.It is an excellent reference because it has all the main results, but not a good book for a beginner. ... Read more

Product Description

Customer Reviews (19)

The evolution theory is important for the game theory.
The book explicates with several examples the part related to "evolution" of the game theory. This aspect is very important for the application to the biology, not only to the economy. The examples are several and they are showed in a simple way. It's important the equilibrium of the Nash bargaining and the connections with the chaos theory.

The Bayesian probability -expected utility-Benthamite Utilitarian approach is fundamentally flawed
The problem with this book,as with practically all game theory approaches,is that it is based on the subjective,Bayesian approach to probability ,which asserts that the coherent (rational) decision maker's probability assessments will always be consistent with the purely mathematical laws of the probability calculus(the addition and multiplication rules used in all tree diagrams and decision trees).This requires that all probabilities are unique,additive,precise,determinate,exact,sharp point estimates.All probability distributions are unique.Only one distribution will be applied by the decision maker, who knows what this specific distribution is for certain.Invariably,this turns out to be the normal probability distribution.The decision maker will engage in Bayesian updating(this should not be confused with Keynesian revision ,which allows the decision maker to change to a different probability distribution entirely when new evidence is obtained if the new evidence shows that the previously assumed distribution was erroneous),which means that the new evidence allows him to update the estimates of the probability parameters specified by the unique probability distribution.However,the probability distribution itself NEVER changes-only the estimates of theparameter values change.Gintis constantly makes reference to the subjective,Bayesian approach ,on about 150 of the pages in his book,as being the foundation for the rational actor model that underlies game theory applications.

The second problem is that the outcomes( Morgenstern-von Neumann utilities) are assumed to be point estimates ; they are just as exact andprecise as the probabilities were assumed to be.A decision is reached by simply adding up theexpected utilities obtained when the point probabilities are multiplied by the point utilities and summed.This is no different than the original claims made by Jeremy Bentham in 1787.Only the mathematical apparatus has changed.

J M Keynes completely demolished this fictitious view of decision making in 1921 when he published his A Treatise on Probability(TP).Keynes proved that the general case ,for both probabilities and outcomes,was that both probabilities and outcomes are only representable by intervals.Only in very special cases,usually occurring in the physical and life sciences(physics,biology,chemistry,engineering)can a decision maker reliably estimate sharp point probabilities and outcomes.Keynes established his conclusionsin chapters 15,17,20,22,26,and 29 of the TP.Keynes also put forth a systematic analysis of decision weights that could be sub and super additive(proportional)or convex -concave.Unfortunately,Frank Plumpton Ramsey decided that he could review Keynes's book based only on a preliminary reading of chapters 3 and 4,with 7-10 other pages apparently chosen at random from the rest of the book.Ramsey made the silly and stupid claim that Keynes's system of probability was based on non numerical(non comparative) probabilities and non numerical(non comparative) degrees of belief.Of course,Keynes defined his nonnumerical probabilities to be intervals representable by inequality constraints and upper-lower bounds(least upper bound-greatest lower bound).Point estimates are special cases where the upper and lower bounds are equal.Keynes had told the reader of chapter 3 TWICE (1921;p. 37,p.38) that the reader should wait until Part II of the TP was reached before drawing any conclusions from chapter 3 about the measurement of probabilities.Ramsey ignored these warnings and based his queer reviews on 2 out of the 33 chapters of the TP.Gintis's entire framework and edifice essentially rests on a foundational approach to probability based on Ramsey's error filled reviews that all probabilities and outcomes can be represented by a single number.


There are severe problems with the logical foundations of subjective probability.Recently,Kadane,Schervish,and Siedenfeld,in their " Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics "(Cambridge University Press,1999), have completely thrown in the towel and admitted implicitly that Keynes was right and Ramsey,De Finetti,and Savage were incorrect.The book is composed of 16 essays,all of which have been previously published in academic journals and/or other books.Throughout the book,the authors concede that there are many holes and deficiencies in the logical foundations of the subjectivist approach.The biggest hole is vastly understated by KSS: " In fact,it seems reasonable to deny that there are consequences in practical decisions.Thus,our position is that,lacking consequences,expected utility theory must treat probability distributions as extraneous(italicized)..."(KSS,1999,p.195).Of course,"...lacking consequences...", means that the outcomes are state independent.On pp.157-160,KSS had already demonstrated the near impossibility in the real world of being able to specify outcomes that would make their utilities state independent.Given that the subjective probabilities are completely extraneous,there is no longer any way in which the a priori beliefs of a decision maker can be represented by a unique probability distribution on purely decision theoretic grounds alone.This means that unique,definite,precise,numerical ,single number estimates of subjective probabilities do not exist.This result goes to the heart of the entire edifice erected by Ramsey,De Finetti,and Savage,in particular.Savage argued that,based on a careful elicitation of subjective preferences based on betting quotients,a unique probability measure(distribution)can be defined to represent the agent's preference relation.Nowhere is it stated by KSS that this position( of Savage) goes to the heart of the dispute between Keynes and Ramseyabout the inherent indeterminateness of many probability estimates.The comparative -interval estimate-approach to estimating probabilities,presented by Keynes for the first time in the A Treatise on Probability(TP;1921,pp.160-163,pp.186-194),is fully operational since all of the problems that used the difficult Boolean approach used by Keynes can instead use the substantially easier integer-mixed integer linear programming approach of Theodore Hailperin in order to obtain solutions.It appears that Ramsey's approach is a very special case of Keynes's approach that is applicable only when a single,unique probability distribution can be specified a priori. KSS's technical result,first presented in 1990 in the Journal of the American Statistical Association(JASA), completely undermines the logical ,decision theoretic foundations of the subjectivist approach to estimating probabilities.
Gintis has overlooked the numerous logical deficiencies in the current Bayesian approach.Keynes has been right all along.Gintis's bookneeds to be completely rewritten since it is primarily based onbizarre assessments and assertions made by Ramsey about Keynes's approach in two very,very poor book reviews in 1922 and 1926. Otherwise,all of the results of the many problems covered by Gintis can only hold under the very specialassumptions made by subjectivist Bayesians about all probabilities and outcomes being point estimates.The reader should also note that the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler done between 1987-2007 on convex -concave capacities and case based decision making is really a rediscovery of the work of Keynes,although,since they have not read the TP,they,like Gintis ,are ignorant of what it was that Keynes did in 1921(Keynes's 1907 and 1908 Fellowship theses also contain his interval estimate approach to probability based on the application of Boole's system of algebra to probability ).

Lecture notes
I am using this book for independent study of Game Theory.

The pros.The problems in the book are excellent.They range from easy to fairly difficult, and manage to cover most nooks and crannies needed for a thorough introduction to contemporary game theory, with some evolutionary and economics background for good measure.For professors, I think this is a good book to use to prepare a class.It has the examples one needs to set up a "zone of proximal development", meaning, an exposition in which one leads the students bit by bit toward better mastery of the ideas.In fact, the choice of problems, the flow from one vignette to another, and the interweaving of problems with important theoretical concepts and expositions leave the impression that the book is closely based on Prof. Gintis's lecture notes.

The cons.The blessing is also the curse: the book reads like a chalkboard with commentary rather than like a textbook.If you are expecting the familiar cadence of background - theory - examples - problems, you will not find it here.This can be refreshing, but takes getting used to.A more serious drawback is that solutions at the end of the book are very sketchy, so beginners will find it difficult to connect all the dots without outside help.Students expecting a more thorough style are likely to find the book infuriating.

In brief, the quality of material is high, but the treatment could have used a once- or a twice-over.Solid reference, very good for preparing a class, but if you are using it for home study, have someone to call on when you get stuck on a problem.Also, if you are a mathematically competent social scientist, I would recommend another book in parallel, such as Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis "Game Theory - A Critical Text".While Gintis is very hands-on, Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis spend much more time on warranted and unwarranted assumptions game theory makes about human psychology, as well as epistemological concerns - details needed to understand how the theory fits within social sciences.These two books complement each other quite well.

Book on Game Theory Evolving by H. Gintis
I recently purchased this book through Amazon.com. The book is excellent. The treatment of the topic is in depth and the examples are very profound. The exercises also are very though provoking and it is a great book for anyone who wants to learn more about Game Theory.

The service by amazon was also outstanding. I obtained the book on the promised date. All queries regarding the order were answered promptly and professionally.

Lots of errors, this book stinks
I bought the 2000 edition of this book, which has so many errors that it's unreadable, and some of the problems are unsolvable because of the errors.I found enough errors in the second chapter alone to make me give up on it.The author has a link to a file of errata on his web page, but the link was dead.I contacted the author to ask for the errata, and he told me to buy the 2002 edition.I insisted, and he e-mailed me the file.I didn't find either of two major errors that I had noticed in the errata.The book has very few examples, so it took me a long time to realize that my trouble with the problems as presented was because of errors with the problems, not because the problems were particularly hard.Don't buy this book, period. ... Read more

Product Description
Authored by Raph Koster, Chief Creative Officer of Sony Online Entertainment, this brilliantly illustrated book is a storyboard filled with inspirational ideas for all designers.As Will Wright (co-creator of SimCity 2000 and SimCopter) states in his foreword, "Raph forages across wide intellectual landscapes and then returns to share what he’s discovered with the rest of us…. He has filtered out a treasure trove of useful and relevant nuggets from a career’s worth of his own research."

A Theory of Fun for Game Design features a novel way of showing interactive designers how to improve their designs to incorporate the highest degree of fun.This book will truly inspire and challenge game designers, as well as artists and designers from all segments of the industry.The unique format of A Theory of Fun, with engaging text and thought-provoking illustrations, will ensure that this book becomes a classic text for designers.Already endorsed by major players in the gaming world – such as BoingBoing, Noah Falstein, and Henry Jenkins of MIT – A Theory of Fun covers such essential topics as:

• Why some games are fun and others boring• Why making a game too hard—or too easy—is a mistake• Why games have to balance deprivation and overload, order and chaos, silence and noise• The difference between designing content and creating an experience• Why both adults and children like to play games• How playing a game and learning are connected• The ethics of entertainment ... Read more

Customer Reviews (46)

Without compare
Those who don't rate this book highly simply don't appreciate how revolutionary this book is. If you're a game designer, you absolutely *must* read this.

It's perfecting skills.
There, now you know the theory.

This book has a lot of some interesting material in it. Mainly I enjoyed being pointed to other resources in his notes. As far as a theory of fun, he just says players like to grok the game environment. He then explores responsible game design among other issues with that paradigm in the forefront, taking a very flat look at games.

Maybe if he gave this book a different title I would have liked it.

A Theory of Obvious
Like many other books about game development, Raph Koster's A Theory of Fun For Game Design is, implicitly, misleading in its title. There really isn't much about the practice of game design in this book. Instead it is more of a paean to game design by a long-time practitioner. The book is full of anecdotes, jokes, asides, and other errata from the life of a game designer. It's a form of swan song, a 'my life in games, and why I lived it' type of thing.

This isn't necessarily bad, but the potential buyer should be aware of this fact. One certainly wouldn't deduce this fact by reading the gushing praise other game industry veterans have lavished upon the book. Everyone from Will Wright to Scott Miller insists that you must have this book if you want to learn about game design. Perhaps this says more about the integrity of the peer review process than anything else. But I digress.

The primary source of my disappointment with this book is how little it actually conveys regarding the process of game design. Once one discounts the cartoons (which appear on every other page, taking up a full page), the anecdotes, the jokes, the stories about music and children ... there really isn't much content remaining. And what does remain is often either obvious, redundant, or just plain wrong.

In the 'just plain wrong' area, Raph commits many errors. He states that with a book one cannot practice a pattern or run permutations on it (makes me wonder what all those math and programming books I purchased were good for). He states that humans cannot comprehend language that is 'too deeply nested' (which is completely false - any rule of language can be learned with practice).

In the 'obvious' camp, Raph informs us that games are 'puzzles to solve'. The only difference between a game and real life, he posits, is that 'the stakes are lower with games'. A good game is one that conveys 'everything it has to offer before the player stops playing'. And, in a head-smackingly obvious conclusion, Raph asserts that 'the more constraints your game has, the more limited it will be'.

Obviously any critique of anything, be it music, writing, or art, is considerably subjective. My opinion might well differ from yours in many areas. But I think I can safely say that this level of writing is below standard. I cannot imagine, really, what anyone could learn regarding game design from this book ... unless they came at it with no knowledge of what a game is.

And this is what leads me to my conclusion: that this book is intended for children, or for someone with a child's level of understanding of games - essentially, for an outsider. The level of writing, the amateurish cartoons, the dialogue itself, all seem intended for a person who has absolutely no knowledge of what a game is, why people play games, what fun is, what boredom is ... it's instructive in a manner that is entirely facile and pedantic; rather like a pop-up book about the solar system helpfully explaining that when the sun goes away, the sky becomes dark.

Perhaps in some hippie, 70's-culture fashion, this is meant to unlock the child in all of us. But I just found the experience exasperating. I don't expect a person with years of experience in an industry to speak to me about it as if he were cooing to a child. And I expect that, if someone with such experience were to write a book, they would have something important to convey - some information that I could not find elsewhere, or deduce myself. Otherwise, why would I purchase the book?

In the end, this book simply has very little knowledge to convey. Games are puzzles. People enjoy solving puzzles. People become bored with puzzles that they can solve too easily, and frustrated with ones that are too hard. Water is wet. The sky is blue. Et cetera.

Inspiring and Cleverly Entertaining
Raph Koster's "A Theory of Fun for Game Design" is a great book for anyone who is either a gamer or even remotely interested in pursuing a job in game design. Koster explains the psychology behind games, and explores how and why they are either entertaining or dull. Koster is short and to the point, and is very clear with his ideas. A comic every other page provides the occasional laugh, and all the jokes are relevant.

After reading this I feel like I have a firm grasp on what makes a game good, and I could make a good game as well. I am a Digital Media student focused on game design, and this book really helped me with providing some advice from a well-established professional. Couldn't recommend this book enough.

Thought provoking
While a bit rambling and repetitive, I much enjoyed this book, finding it useful when thinking about games and about making software that feels more like game play.The book explores what makes games fun, why we play games, and how games can serve a larger purpose of learning and growth.

The book is also quite funny with some hilarious one-liners supporting the point he is trying to make.Some of my favorites were: "Basically, our brains are on drugs pretty much all the time" and "We're just tribal monkeys throwing feces at each other in order to own the top of the tree." ... Read more

Product Description
An easy-to-follow, non-technical approach to using game theory in every business battle

Game theory has become entrenched in today's business world. It has also often required oppressive and incomprehensible mathematics. Game Theory at Work steers around math and pedagogy to make this innovative tool accessible to a larger audience and allow all levels of business to use it to both improve decision-making skills and eliminate potentially lethal uncertainty.

This proven tool requires everyone in an organization to look at the competition, guage his or her own responses to their actions, and then establish an appropriate strategy. Game Theory at Work will help business leaders at all levels improve their overall performance in:

• Negotiating
• Decision making
• Establishing strategic alliances
• Marketing
• Positioning
• Branding
• Pricing

Customer Reviews (17)

Interesting Review
The book has been misunderstood and so was the author. This book is about strategy and should not be confused with ethics. A large number of decisions that are made in daily life are not always morally correct but they are still strategic. The author was honest and outspoken. This is something that should be appreciated and not criticized. This book is people who just want to enjoy a good read of strategy and not start a theological analysis. My sincere wishes and respect for the author.

Easy to understand intro to game theory in the real world
Forget the reviewers who panned it, they do not seem to even begin to understand the premises of game theory.Game theory is not about morality, it is about how a totally rational entity that wants to maximize his payoffs should act.This book has a lot of useful insights and is very easy to read.

A Complete Load of C$%P
Do not buy this book if you want to learn anything meaningful or "real world" about game theory.The author's examples are irrelevant and in some cases not applicable to game theory constructs.

Useful but there's a question of ethics
While I'm for any book which may prove useful in life and grant that Mr. Miller's might be one of those, I see by other reviews and by my own investigation that Mr. Miller's wife, Prof. Debbie Felton Miller, has not only given her husband's book a 5-star rating but has co-authored at least two other articles & books with him.This info is from the umass.edu website in the "faculty" section as follows:
Recent Publications
2002. With James D. Miller. Using Greek Mythology to Teach Game Theory. The American Economist 46.2.

2002. With James D. Miller. Truth Inducement in Greek Myth. Syllecta Classica 13.104-25.

This calls into question the ethics and honesty of both the author and this "educator" who is tenured at the University of Massachussets.Another point worth mentioning is that David Miller is a contributing editor at Tech Central Station which is an online platform for conservative and right-wing political types. (I've been reading his and other articles there) - [...]

I would not recommend this book, unless one is interested in being persuaded to accept questionable ideologies and questionable ethics of the "me first" variety.

As simple as it gets...
Great book! Simple defininitons, lots of explanations and lots of examples & case studies....For those who have no idea about Game Theory, the writer created a planet for you, a simple & understandable GameTheoryPlanet...He really made me understand what it is all about...Thanks...GURKAN OZER ... Read more

Product Description
Games are everywhere: Drivers maneuvering in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. The supermarket's price for corn flakes is decided by playing an economic game.This Very Short Introduction offers a succinct tour of the fascinating world of game theory, a ground-breaking field that analyzes how to play games in a rational way. Ken Binmore, a renowned game theorist, explains the theory in a way that is both entertaining and non-mathematical yet also deeply insightful, revealing how game theory can shed light on everything from social gatherings, to ethical decision-making, to successful card-playing strategies, to calculating the sex ratio among bees. With mini-biographies of many fascinating, and occasionally eccentric, founders of the subject--including John Nash, subject of the movie A Beautiful Mind--this book offers a concise overview of a cutting-edge field that has seen spectacular successes in evolutionary biology and economics, and is beginning to revolutionize other disciplines from psychology to political science. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (11)

an all right book
It was an all right book but got somewhat technical and isn't for the casual reader. This is a book for someone needing some reference and a brief introduction to Game Theory who is possibly a math major or someone who is interested in Game Theory. Not for someone that thinks the title is cool and somehow related to other areas in life such as self help or the secret to life. This is mathematics!

I got lost with all the terminology and had to make notes and make an effort to learn the book. Other books of this series definitely come more naturally to the reader than this one.
All in all, there's probably better, more comprehensible works for the introduction to Game Theory

Inconsistent and frustrating, but I think I emerged a bit wiser
I read Prisoner's Dilemma by Poundstone and mustered up enough interest to dip my toe into Game Theory. This VSI called to me from the library shelves and I settled in. Now I'm a technical sort with background in Math & Engineering, and I sailed through the first few pages. All of a sudden, Binmore went ape and waded into the deep end with all sorts of jargon, casual reference to terms not previously defined and I began to sweat. But gamely (ha ha) I persevered and probably made some headway with Nash Equilibria.

But Binmore would have none of that. I read the caption for Figure 14 and threw in the towel. The graph shows "Evolutionary Adjustment in the Ultimatum Minigame" and concludes by asserting that "The other Nash equilibria ... all require the use of the weakly dominated strategy /no/, but (the set) N still has a large basin of attraction in the case of the replicator dynamics".

Binmore 1, Reader 0. Game Over.

The term "Introduction" in the title is not consistent with reader expectations. I'd recommend the Poundstone book for anyone wanting to learn more about the subject.

Not A Very Good Introduction
The reviewers for this book are forming into two different camps, those who find it a good introduction and those who feel that it does not do a good job introducing the subject matter at all.I fall in the latter group.The book does a poor job of describing the basic principles needed to understand the rest of the material.The author tries to avoid technical jargon and algebra, but to no avail to this reader.I will try and find another book on Game Theory that may do a better job.Perhaps it could supplement this book, but that is not the point of A Very Short Introduction, is it?

Excellent qualitative survey of game theory
Within the framework of the "a very short introduction" written as a qualitative and popular work rather than a formal text or a text for a specific audience Ken Binmore turned out an excellent qualitative survey of game theory.Binmore presents a history of the people that formulated game theory, an overview of the mathmatical models and processes, and a superb discussion of the applications of the various tools.If you're looking for derivations, sigma notation, and other mathmatica that make this liberal arts major's head spin, you might consider Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.

Unlike other books on game theory, Binmore pays considerable attention to the psychology of the actors in games and how that impacts their decision processes and the value of strategy availible to an opposing player.

E. M. Van Court

Horrible Introduction
I agree with all of the other negative reviews of this title. I have read a fair number of books from the very short introduction series, most of which I highly recommend. This title, however, is sub-par to say the least. Anyone interested in game theory should look else where. ... Read more

Product Description
Strategy, Second Edition, is a thoroughrevisionand update of one ofthe most successful GameTheory texts available.Known for its accurate and simple-yet-thoroughpresentation, Joel Watsonhas refined his text to make it even more student friendly. Highlights of therevisioninclude theaddition of Guided (or Solved) Exercises and a significant expansion of thematerial for politicaleconomists and politicalscientists. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (6)

Great, easy to read
I found this book well worth my money. It's quite accessible and has great examples. I like the guided problem sets. I just wish the exercises had an answer key. They're great practice.

Excellent
Item is in excellent condition, and it was posted for delivery just the next day and arrived within a week.

Witty and clear
As far as economics textbooks go, this one is very readable. Its treatment of the subject is clear and reasonably rigorous on the undergraduate level. The author is also quite witty.

Review: Strategy
Really book for game theory and contract theory. The author does a really good job of explaining the theory with examples that are easy to understand.

good book, great professor
Comment to the last review:This book is an excllent txbook, especially when the prof teaching this class is Joel Watson himself.Very interesting prof he is.
The book is very useful and easy to follow. ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (7)

Like reading murky Elizabethan prose for this generation of game theorists
Like reading murky Elizabethan prose for this generation of game theorists.

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (TGEB) is the Ur-text of game theory, and Morgenstern and von Neumann bridge the gap and make discoveries between logical positivism, formal logic, choice sets, number theory, and binomial and multinomial outcomes.

But in retrospect, this work is rather cumbersome and notation, because so much of it was new, is often baffling to those who have learned game theory from more modern lecturers: a lot of clarity and light has been shed on the field since this was written.

As brilliant as the insights of von Neumann, and to a lesser extent Morgenstern, were, they were building in response to the nearly simultaneous discoveries by Nash of a new sub-set of mathematics, and like all new fields the first expression needed editing and focus. For this is this work's flaw: it attempted as a first expression of a new field to be comprehensive. Whereas Nash's discovery of equilibrium was lean and concise, with profound reverberations throughout decision sciences, TGEB is bloated and sometimes misguided: economics is too huge a field, and even then the concept of homo economicus rationalis was crumbling under the discovery that people make suboptimal decisions all the time.

For those who are reading this for historical curiosity, I suggest William Poundstone's "Prisoner's Dilemma" in conjunction with TGEB, but frankly modern expressions of game theory in more abbreviated texts such as Harold Kuhn's works are actually better because they've cleaned out the dead ends and tightened up he notation and expression.

very fast shipping, great transaction
I was very happy with book I received. Book was as described and shipped very fast. Thank You!

revolutionary
This book is a must for high level math or econ. majors.To truly understand all the math you need advanced calculus, but the book is still worth while if you only have a basic knowledge of math.The work von Neumann did was revolutionary, with game theory being a joke before this work.You should read it.

Please, the genius speak!
This book is very important for the quality of argument by two big personalities. The lecture is nice for the richness of particulars about several aspects of the theory. The student can understand the singular properties very cleary. The historical importance of this book is very strong.

Thorough, Maybe Too Thorough
I am in the middle of this book now.I chose it because it was the first in this field.It presents so much information, it can overwhelming.Perhaps I should have chosen a simpler book for my first.Oh well, I will plod along.My limited math skills meas I miss out on a lot of the book, but the stuff in between the math is great and is helping me to better understand the ideas.
I'm giving it four stars.It is jam-packed with great research and the reader can learn quite a bit, but the heavy math emphasis makes it difficult for many to consume. ... Read more

Product Description
This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how law works. The book highlights the basic mechanisms at work and lays out a natural progression in the sophistication of the game concepts and legal problems considered. 47 line illustrations. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Great analysis of common strategic behavior problems
This is a great example of how the rigor of game theory can give startling insights into outcomes of common situations. Although I'm no mathematician or economist, all business people are at some point required to base their decisions on how they think others will behave. This book provides some great frameworks for structuring that thought process.

Unique
Altough it's often just theory, is a unique book, rxpressing the Chicago school's view on law. Do not expect something you can use practically.

A pathbreaking work of importance and clarity
This book popularizes and extends a new approach (non-cooperative game theory) to the economic analysis of law. Readable and concise, this book is a must for students and scholars wishing to understand the ways in which legal rules can be usefully modeled as non-cooperative games. As a professor in the discipline, I am awed by the important and brilliant scholarship presented in this book with superb skill. ... Read more

Product Description
This book pays careful attention to applications of game theory in a wide variety of disciplines. The applications are treated in considerable depth. The book assumes only high school algebra, yet gently builds to mathematical thinking of some sophistication. Game Theory and Strategy might serve as an introduction to both axiomatic mathematical thinking and the fundamental process of mathematical modelling. It gives insight into both the nature of pure mathematics, and the way in which mathematics can be applied to real problems. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (9)

Insufficient
I expected a game theory textbook, and found far far less.There are many case studies which are barely relevant, and the theorems and equations are not laid out clearly.There are far better books out there on game theory, with greater depth, breadth, and clarity.There is nothing which I found this book to have superior to others.It has taught me to be wiser in considering my purchases.

Author deserves credit
If Prof. Straffin teaches as well as he writes he has some happy students. The book wastes no time in explaining the concepts clearly. Although the math is not inherently difficult, the concepts can be tough to fully understand and apply if not explained well.

Would recommend this book to anyone interested in game theory.

The best introduction to game theory ever written
Game theory is an area of mathematics that has a very short history; it began with the publication of the classic book, "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. It is a very dynamic field, having applications ranging from parlor games to economic competition to potential warfare between nations. Straffin covers all of these areas in a manner accessible to anyone with a mathematical bent.
To me, the most interesting games are those that rely on the unpredictability of human behavior and there is nothing better to illustrate this than the prisoner's dilemma. Two criminals are captured and kept in separate rooms. If both keep silent, there is no evidence against them and they are released, but if one talks and the other doesn't the talker gets a reward and the silent one gets two years. If both confess, then each gets one year. In the standard model, the fear of being the fall guy causes both to confess, even though it is to their mutual advantage for both to keep silent. Straffin covers this situation in detail.
As some of the examples point out, free markets, where each participant pursues their self-interest are not always the most efficient way to allocate resources or make decisions. Cooperation between the participants where each gets something less than the potential optimal can be the superior way to make decisions. This occurs when the payoff is high when only a few can take advantage but is negative or low if all try to take advantage.
There is no area of mathematics that can match the fascinating consequences of game theory. It is about the complex interactions between humans, both individually and in groups. In my opinion, it is impossible to understand sociology if you lack understanding of basic game theory. This book is the best place to acquire that understanding.

Perfect First Simple Game Theory for Ordinary People
This is a good first book about game theory for those who are not afraid of math but not mathematically inclined. The book is full of math but the simple explanations and the way the author builds up to the theory makes it simple to follow.

I actually bought this copy for my library. I had used this book in college but had borrowed that copy from a friend.

An Excellent Small Book on Game Theory
I read a couple of books on game theory. This is one of the better books... but it also has one small advantage... it's small. I carry it almost everywhere and read its short chapters (another advantage) without getting too tired. It's also quite difficult to get tired reading the book as the author keeps his explanations fairly simple, lively, and to the point.

A good spread of topics and examples too! ... Read more

Product Description
This book examines why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It investigates the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or remain an important tool for economists. The book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. All those interested in the applications of game theory to economics, from undergraduates to academics will find this study of particular value. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

A Very Nice Introduction to the Topic
I picked up this book a couple of weeks back in order to broaden my knowledge of Game Theory in the field of economic modeling. Since I was looking for an introduction with brief explanations of topics, a few pointers etc.; I would say, I was very pleased with the content matter as well as with the manner of presentation.

What it is NOT: As have been mentioned by a few reviewers, this work is NOT a detailed text-book in Game Theory, or its varied applications, or Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Modeling. If you're looking for any or all of these, kindly refer to other works.

What it is: Instead, it's a very nice introduction into the world of "non-cooperative game theoretic economic modeling" especially in the context of bargaining between employers and workers, optimizing production function(s) for monopolistic firms, detecting incredible and credible threats etc. The introductions to Normal and Strategic forms of non-cooperative games theoretic representations, the "Folk Theorem", "von Stackelberg" type repetitive games etc are very nicely exemplified.

Kindly bear in mind: As the author mentions at the very beginning, it is not a text book. Anyone starting out on a journey of Game Theory in Macro-economic and Micro-economic modeling would do well, if he/she would read this work and then move on to a more comprehensive text-book. Since this work is not voluminous in size and very easily piled up (both to the author's credit), it's a very nice introduction to the subject.

4th March, 2006

Subhasish Ghosh
St. Cross College, University of Oxford

Good Background
The intro suggests that this book is for a casual reader who is looking to understand Game Theory.I agree.I read this book along with the text by the same author and am very pleased that I did.I can understand his textbook much easier after reading the book.I feel like the book is a very interesting read, which never gets too technical.He indicates several points where a textbook would be better, that in this format he is just looking to give an overview.Regardless, I have found that studying game theory is much better having read this book.The topic can be a little overwhelming at first, but with Kreps, it comes out fine in the end.

A lecture, not a book
This is an offhand lecture by a professional in the field. It's not a textbook or a monograph - it is a side look at the state of the field. The author explains why game theory was useful in explaining various phenomena, but at the same time gives us hints for why it failed to explain others. You will learn that the abundancy of equilibria and structure in repeated games will enable you to prove almost anything, which is the weakness rather than a strength of this tool. Kreps defines the limits of the field and tells the reader what is yet to be done in game theory - and why.

A good read after a theoretical textbook. It allows you to stop, turn around and ask yourself a few fundamental questions.

Game theory
Its alright, I guess. Rasmusen is much better. ... Read more

Product Description
“I am hard pressed to think of another book that can match the combination of practical insights and reading enjoyment.”—Steven LevittGame theory means rigorous strategic thinking. It’s the art of anticipating your opponent’s next moves, knowing full well that your rival is trying to do the same thing to you. Though parts of game theory involve simple common sense, much is counterintuitive, and it can only be mastered by developing a new way of seeing the world. Using a diverse array of rich case studies—from pop culture, TV, movies, sports, politics, and history—the authors show how nearly every business and personal interaction has a game-theory component to it. Mastering game theory will make you more successful in business and life, and this lively book is the key to that mastery. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (13)

Entertaining
Very entertaining intro to game theory.Some of the materials can be little confusing but overall, they are easy to follow and understand.

Good book but not exactly a page turner
Started reading this book but have yet to finish.It started out to be very interesting, but about half way through, I started to get a bit bored.I wasn't keeping my attention like the first chapters.It is a good read though and I do recommend it to others.Hope to finish reading the rest of it soon.I'll update this review if my opinion changes.

Great!
Shipped fast.The book is not the best book out there but it does give some interesting views and ideas about strategies in business.

The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist's Guide to Success in Business and Life
It's nice to see that some things you learn in school can be taken with you later. //The Art of Strategy// shows that all of that math has practical value.

//The Art of Strategy// explores how game theory applies to business and life in general. Suffice it to say that means dealing with a lot of math. However, dealing with that math, and some relatively obscure math at that (at least for us non-mathematicians) does have some great payoff in that we learn a lot about how interrelated things can be; even the most obscure relationships are explored, and how they can affect your life and business. It's fun to explore those relationships, and the book is fun to read for as much math as there is. In that regard it's great that this book was written with great enthusiasm, and is one of those few academic books written with respect for its audience.

//The Art of Strategy// is one of those books that you will read and probably let your friends borrow; this book will definitely be one you want on your shelves to be re-read every so often.

Reviewed by Jamais Jochim

Brilliant
Wide ranging and written with exceptional clarity. This is by far the best lay man's book about game theory I have come across. A worthy successor to "Thinking Strategically." ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (7)

Insightful Analysis
A must-read for anyone who is considering changing careers, or for those lucky enough to get this book before they have set off on their career path.Excellent insight into the steps one can take to widen your professional network, and to increase your desirability to employers and partners.And in this economy, when the question all too often is not "is this person qualified?" but "is this person the most qualified?", this book is even more important.

A fine career management survey
YOUR CAREER GAME: HOW GAME THEORY CAN HELP YOU ACHIEVE YOUR PROFESSIONAL GOALS shows how game theory can help readers take charge of their careers. It can be used to manage coworkers, managers, and others in a way that supports career goals - and it tells how workers can become better 'players' in their own game. Conversations with a range of successful professionals make this a fine career management survey.

Career Management
This is a great book. I have always struggled with moving from where I think I want my career to go and how to actually get there. I have done the "parachute" thing and read other books on career management but this book really helped me understand how to move things from theory to action. Not only did it help build the base I need to understand game theory, which we all play everyday without even knowing it, it provided the tools to apply the concepts to managing my career. There is a section on how to best leave a position as well. This is something I have tried to do well but I see now that I can do it better, which will help my reputation and legacy and the organization from which I departed; all important things for me. I also liked how the book explains it's not what one talks about in interviews with respect to 'critical success factors' or 'knowledge, skills, and abilities' but rather the employ of these skills to their greatest benefit for my career plan. For me the interviews used in the book to illustrate points bring things from theory to practice. I understand what worked and what did not work when these enormously successful people played their games and can employ that information as I play mine. Lastly, as a manager and game player, I have and will continue to compete and work with people from all walks of life and generations. The insights offered about the younger generations and how they approach the game will help me better strategize their moves as a player. As a manger, I will have a better understanding of the way these generations approach their careers and work. I highly recommend this book.

Create your professional roadmap
A new way to think about how the big and small professional choices you make influence people around you and your future. Looking at where you are, where you want to be and how to get there is something we all should be doing. This book is a good reminder of that, with some refreshing tips on how to stay engaged in that thought process and get ahead as a result. Definitely worth a read.

Finally - realistic advice for your career!
As someone who has searched for many jobs (within and outside of my original industry), and made various moves - this book finally addresses what it takes to get ahead and how to address the challenges of the "competitive landscape"! We typically only think about getting the job and then naturally getting promoted through good work, and don't think about what other factors we need to be considering (such as the mentoring relationships we need to be developing and how to get noticed in your role to get ahead#. Even better, the book contains extensive interviews from a diverse array of successful executives whose own careers are not only educational, but inspiring. As we see a new generation enter the workforce in one of the most challenging economies the world has seen #as well as see individuals have to restart their careers in a new industry), this book is also a tool for getting to that next step. This book changes how you think about your career - it's no longer a simple game of checkers, it's a game of chess and you have to be strategic to get ahead! ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (3)

Great ideas for unification, that may fail to unify.
This book departs from a very good set of questions: How can it be that several different behavioral sciences - sociology, social psychology, economics, biology - all study human social behavior, yet have vastly different conceptual frameworks? And perhaps more importantly: is there a way to unify these frameworks?

Professor Herbert Gintis is uniquely qualified to tackle these questions: as any reader of his Amazon book reviews can see, he is very widely read in all the social sciences, and much of his own research is interdisciplinary. Gintis proposes that game theory - a mathematical framework for analyzing strategic interactions between individuals - can play the role of unifying framework for the social sciences. The first half of the book is dedicated to explaining the basic concepts of game theory, and how it applies to basic issues in human social behavior.

The second half of the book is dedicated to connecting game theory to the sociological concept of a social norm. A central point in Gintis' argument is the concept of correlated equilibrium. A correlated equilibrium augments the well-known Nash equilibrium by addinga correlating device. A correlating device - or choreographer as Gintis' calls it - essentially is a random variable with the distribution over the set of strategy profiles. The correlating device selects a strategy profile (one strategy for each player) and tells each player what to do according to this strategy profile. If it is optimal for each player to follow the advice of the choreographer given her beliefs about what the choreographer advised the other players, a correlating equilibrium exist. As an example of this one can think of a traffic light. When the traffic light tells you to drive, it is optimal to do so, because you know the traffic light simultaneously tells other people to hold still. Thus, the traffic light coordinates the actions on the intersection.

Gintis maintains that the correlating equilibrium is a better candidate to provide the technical underpinnings of the concept of a social norm than the Nash equilibrium. Gintis argues that the social norm functions as a correlating device, which assigns a particular action to everyone engaged in interaction. Actions are in equilibrium when it is in everybodies' interest to follow the social norm if they expect others to do so. The reason that the correlated equilibrium ismore suited to describe a social norm than the Nash equilibrium lies in the conditions that underly both concepts. While the Nash equilibrium relies on the assumption that all players in the game have correct expectations about theactions of all the other players, the correlated equilibrium merely requires that people share a common prior belief about the actions recommended by the correlating device. If the correlating device is a social norm, these prior beliefs are induced by indicators that activate the social norm. How such prior belief can come to be shared is the subject of an entire chapter.

Professor Gintis should be praised for his commitment to methodological unification. Especially worthwhile in this respect is the last chapter, where he proposes several concepts that could form the shared theoretical background in all the social sciences. He also submits some sensible proposals, such as the use of the correlating equilibrium, and the comments on methodological individualism are provoking and stimulating.

However, for several reasons I fear that the book will have limited influence in actually bringing together scientific disciplines. First, its organization is at times mysterious, and never argued for. The connections between the chapters are often unclear. There are some parts that will not interest most readers, like the extensive treatment of certain paradoxes in epistemic game theory. This relates to the second problem: the book is rather technical in its exposition. This will make it hard for anyone who is not steeped in mathematics or does not already know game theory. And anyone who has taken the trouble to learn game theory up to the technical level that is required to read Gintis' book will probably be already convinced of its usefulness. Third, the book is lacking in good examples. Although the argumentsurrounding the correlated equilibrium is connectedloosely to astory about flagging taxis, this raises more questions than it answers. For someone who want to convince sociologists that game theory can be connected to basic sociological ideas like norm following and role theories, this is a rather serious omission. Finally, there are some harsh dismissals of alternative methodologies in the social sciences which, although I tend to find them reasonable, are bound to bruise some egos. Altogether, it is hard to escape the impression that this is a book for game theorists, by a game theorist, which is puzzling given its stated aim.

In short, a stimulating and impressive book with sensible ideas. Unfortunately, I fear it lacks the didactic sensitivity to reach across scientific disciplines, and thereby does not quite fulfill its lofty aim.

The easy way for the game theory
Gintis substains this position in according with the fact that the game theory is adapt to explicate social models. The mathematics that he applies is no very difficult and the proofs are clearly made by the auctor. This book is linked to the trust in the possibility to preview in some way the human behaviour.

Easy to read yet containing more content than most books
I saw this book on a counter in a book store.I saw the quote on the front from Nobel-Prize-winning economist Vernon Smith likening it to the works of David Hume and Adam Smith---strong praise indeed.I was intrigued, so I picked up the book and leafed through it.I couldn't finish it at the book store so I bought it and took it home.

I can't do justice to this book in a sentence or two.Professor Gintis sets an ambitious goal for this book--reconciling the various behavioral sciences (economics, psychology, biology, and sociology) with their different, indeed conflicting, explanations of human behavior.He examines how the insights into human behavior given by game theory are complemented by understandings drawn from other social sciences.

Although I have little familiarity with game theory, I found the book relatively easy to follow.The writing is clear---with many short sentences rather than paragraph-long, pseudo-academic clouds of words.The author appears to have put considerable effort in to making the material accessible---he avoids difficult mathematics even if doing so slightly expands the needed explanations.

This book is both thought provoking and enjoyable.I strongly recommend it to any graduate student or professional in the social sciences.I plan to give copies as gifts to a few people.

It's only $25.20 if you buy it through Amazon rather than the $35 I paid in a bookstore.


================

An engineer who values economics



... Read more

Product Description
Here's something to do at your next dinner party afterthe guests have wined and dined, tell them you're auctioning off adollar--a plain U.S. one-dollar bill. But set the rules as follows:while the winner gets the dollar, the second-highest bidder must alsopay the amount of his last bid, even though he gets nothing.

If you can get a single one-cent bid, chances are the auction will goto fifty cents. If someone bids fifty-one cents, bidding will almostcertainly reach a dollar. If it goes to one dollar and one cent, thesky's the limit. No one wants to be the second-highestbidder. Afterwards the bidders say they spent so much because theiropponent "went crazy," which is a little like saying "thefight started when he hit me back."

Everyone has gotten into situations that resembled the dollarauction--where they devoted way too much effort to something notworth the commitment, because the cost of giving up was worse.

Why do we act this way? How can we recognize these traps before we'rein too deep? Is there such a thing as rational behavior, and if so,how do we use it to our advantage?

Hungarian mathematician Laszlo Mero introduces us to the basics ofJohn von Neumann's game theory and shows how it illuminates suchaspects of human psychology as altruism, competition, andpolitics. Mero covers such concepts as zero-sum games; Prisoner'sDilemma; the game of Chicken (played with cars in Rebel Without ACause), where logic proves that the rational strategy is to beirrational; how to be kind to your lover through game theory; and whenthe Golden Rule works and when it leads to disaster.

Mero shows how game theory is applicable to fields ranging fromphysics to evolutionary biology, and explores the role of rationalthinking in the context of real-life situations ranging from doorwayetiquette to the nuclear arms race. He also explains how moraldilemmas arise; how to act rationally and ethically when they do; andhow the intersection of rationality and irrationality inevitablybecomes what we call "wisdom." This fascinating, urbane bookshows us how we can better understand ethical behavior. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (10)

Human (ir)rationality
Anyone who studies Economics gets to know the problems of rationality assumptions. Even more in game theory, these assumptions lead to results which are not observed in reality exactly because they are not real-like assumptions. The treatment brought up by this book assesses this issue very well.
Great purchase, I recommend!

Covers Such Concepts As Zerosum Games;...
"Is there such a thing as rational behavior, and if so, how do we use it to our advantage?
Hungarian mathematician Laszlo Mero introduces us to the basics of John von Neumann's game theory and shows how it illuminates such aspects of human psychology as altruism, competition, and politics.

Mero COVERS SUCH CONCEPTS AS ZEROSUM GAMES;....."
[from the book of the back cover]

Must Read for anyone interested in math or physics or biology or psychology or economics or mysticism
Laszlo is a master game theorist who is also able to convey the essence of many other complex and abstract fields and explain those concepts vis-a-vis game theory principles.

The many fields which he observes are
1) Evolution - the debate between group selection and gene selection
2) Bluffing - Can there be a formula that can help you bluff.
3) Human behaviour in auctions.
4) The play between Socialism and Free Enterprise or competition-cooperation in societies and economies.
5) Hawks and Doves - is there a mathematical necessity to have both elements in a society as it evolves.
6) Quantum physics - why do electrons behave or are observed to be behaving according to principles of quantum physics. Is that the electrons behaviour or is that behaviour its existence.
7) What principles of decision making does our conscious and unconscious mind follow?
8) And finally a great comcept that amazed me - mysticism or meditation and its comparison with scientific thought. How eastern concept of meditation, which is based on transcending the mind, compares with the goedele's theorem which says that a system of rational thought can be insufficient to explain everything within that system.

The book does get difficult to read towards the end but for most part Laszlo manages to simplify concepts of immense complexity in simple language.

It's a joy to read and will reignite the scientific thought as well as mystic curiosity in you.

Laszlo Mero, A Big Thank You for this effort.

Great introduction to game theory
The first half of the book was absolutely terrific and I am glad I book, however, it gets a little scattered toward the second half.

Interesting book
The book is divided into three parts:

I. Introduces some concepts from game theory, psychology
II. Gives examples from fields of economics, physics, biology
III. Discusses rationality and irrationality.

I found the first two parts both helpful and easy to read. They weren't technical at all, there isn't a single formula in the book. However, the last part is very hard to read and understand. I had to re-read some sentences several times and am not sure if I followed the author correctly.

Overall, I would suggest reading the book - it won't take much time and you can learn such concepts as evolutionary stable strategies, mixed strategies. Also, presentation of some concepts from physics and economics is interesting. ... Read more

Product Description
Game theory provides a mathematical setting for analyzing competition and cooperation in interactive situations. The theory has been famously applied in economics, but is relevant in many other sciences, such as political science, biology, and, more recently, computer science. This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background. The book is self-contained, providing a formal description of the classic game-theoretic concepts together with rigorous proofs of the main results in the field. The theory is illustrated through abundant examples, applications, and exercises. The style is distinctively concise, while offering motivations and interpretations of the theory to make the book accessible to a wide readership. The basic concepts and results of game theory are given a formal treatment, and the mathematical tools necessary to develop them are carefully presented. Cooperative games are explained in detail, with bargaining and TU-games being treated as part of a general framework. The authors stress the relation between game theory and operations research. The book is suitable for a graduate or an advanced undergraduate course on game theory. Table of Contents: Introduction to decision theory; Strategic games; Extensive games; Games with incomplete information; Cooperative games; Bibliography; Notations; Index of authors; Index of solution concepts; Subject index. (GSM/115) ... Read more