Customer Reviews (1)

Worth Buying for the Exegesis Alone
This work is a criticism of Saul Kripke's work Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. McGinn offers firstly an exegesis of Wittgenstein's position, emphasising that his concerns were predominantly negative rather than positive. The second section of the work deals with Kripke's work. McGinn (p. 68) firstly points out that Wittgenstein, after stating the sceptical paradox, immediately makes it clear that his position is that the paradox arises from a misunderstanding; that is, he does not endorse the conclusion drawn.McGinn then discusses whether Wittgenstein is to be taken as generally sceptical about meaning-related facts (pp. 70-71), concluding that Wittgenstein should be read as proposing a straight solution whereby understanding consists in the fact of having an ability to use signs.McGinn concludes the chapter (pp. 82-92) by criticising Kripke's community conception of rule-following for failing to recognise: Wittgenstein's epistemological naturalism; his emphasis on the blindness or lack of reasons for rule-following; and his emphasis on the equivalence of meaning and use (a distinction that Kripke must exploit for the sceptical paradox to be formulated). McGinn continues in the third chapter to critically analyse Wittgenstein's views.McGinn agrees with Wittgenstein's criticism of inner interpretative states determining meaning, but argues that the role of mental states should not therefore be ruled out entirely, noting (p. 117 n. 33) that "we should preserve the idea that understanding per se is a causal source of use [...] Also, we do not want to pull apart the causal and normative bases of use: what causes use should also be what makes it correct". Overall though, McGinn clearly outlines what he takes to be Wittgenstein's positive position, that meaning "rests ultimately on the bedrock of our natural propensities" (p. 138), and, notwithstanding minor quibbles that are non-essential to its formulation, concurs with it.Finally, McGinn critically analyses Kripke's sceptical solution, offering a variety of objections to both community conceptions of meaning and language modelled on assertability rather than truth conditions.

While my own incliniation is towards a sceptically grounded naturalistic solution to the sceptical paradox, and I find McGinn's attempts to sketch a dispositional account to be highly flawed (refer to the huge amount of secondary literature for the arguments), the real value of the work is the extremely lucid and well-argued exposition of Wittgenstein's main concerns in the Philosophical Investigations, together with the critique of the Kripke interpretation. ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (6)

"Philosophy should be done as a form of poetry"
Near as I can figure out, what Perloff is attempting to accomplish in this book has to do with an examination of the "ordinary language" poetics of the twentieth century. Professor Perloff sees Wittgenstein as the "natural ally" of poets and artists via "the curious collision of the mystical with actual language practices". An attempt at a Wittgensteinian overlay (language games, ordinary language) on such diverse writers as Gertrude Stein, Beckett, on through to the so-called language poets, seems to be the basis for this vague and misty book.

Elaborating upon the dimensions of Wittgenstein's language games as they are seemingly manifest in the writings of Stein, Beckett, two obscure Austrian writers (Bachmann and Bernhard), among others, Perloff gives us her take on Wittgenstein's assertion that "Philosophy ought really be written only as a form of poetry".

Unfortunately, the vague and tenuous linkages of his influence upon the above named writers is just not plausible. The turgid writing style, along with a thesis that does not hang together, make this book a good example of the sterility of the academic mind-set. A very disappointing read, indeed.

A much better and enlightening read is Ray Monk's biography of Wittgenstein - his influence as it has been disseminated in the second half of the twentienth century is cogently presented there.

Perloff's book breaks down as follows:
Chapter 1: About the Tractatus; Chapter 2: About The Philosophical Investigations; Chapter 3: About Gertrude Stein; Chapter 4: About Samuel Beckett; Chapter 5: About Bernhard & Bachmann; Chapter 6: About Language Poetics.

The Cloud Reckoner

Extracts: A Field Guide for Iconoclasts

the ordinariness of perloff's thinking
i've been consistently disappoint with perloff: her writing merely confirms the opinion one might hold after a first reading. these are not extraodinary thoughts if you please. in term of ladder drill's deleuzian musings (poor fellow, procrastinating grad student) perhaps uni and bivalence should be replaced by wittgenstein's own contextual emphasis: a polyvalence which exists fully in pragmatic usage but is institutionalized (territorialized) as stagnant grammatical catergories, which 'poetic' usage then transgresses (master-slave, deterritorialization whatever). in terms of repetition and institutionalization, i think any serious thinking through poetic site needs a more thorough model of meaning/signification that acknowledges speech, where reiteration is polyvalent simultaneously with its capacity for univalent recognition within official discourses.whether we'd like to think this through with simple shifters, wittgenstein's pattern of substitution, or a rose is a rose is a rose is a rose is your choice... the simplification of communication/language/speech/whatever into ordinary/poetic doesn't even start to do the question justice.(as some people's idiolectical adoption testifies to quite nicely) cheers.

Ladder Drills
While I found myself largely indifferent to Marjorie Perloff's Wittgenstein's Ladder, it did prompt me to ask a particular question: Can one plausibly conclude that there is a certain reflexive property to language as it is used in both ordinary and poetic modes?That is, if it is the case, as Perloff argues, that the poetic use of ordinary language estranges one from its mundanity, is the reverse also true?Does the poetic use of language estrange one from ordinary use?Is it possible that a singular attention to the practical/utilitarian value of language effectively render one purblind to its inherent strangeness, which poetic use brings to the fore?I found this to be the fundamental concern of her work, although it appears that, in the absence of any definitive conclusion concerning the preeminence of ordinary language and the parasitism of poetical language upon it (or vice versa), Perloff maintains that the distinction is ultimately a matter of preference.
To see the above uncertainty regarding the relative primacy of ordinary language over poetic language (or vice versa), as Perloff does, is to accept this uncertainty as constitutive of the inherently aporetic nature of language, particularly semantics.In other words, prior to, during, and long after its instantiation within a given utterance, every word possesses a bivalent potentiality: a certain equal "suitability" toward either ordinary or poetic usage.Thus a word's semantic value within a particular utterance is ultimately a matter of divining the strategy of the speaker in employing that word.This problem, becomes a problem of other minds, then, and not a problem of language.However, I wonder if it is possible return the problem to one of language itself.In the interest of so doing, I offer the following hypothesis: Instead of ascribing to a word a particular semiological bivalency, one should regard a word as essentially univalent, and that singular valence is its ordinary signification.Poetic use thus becomes not a particular mode of employment but a method of destruction, specifically the destruction of ordinary, singular semantic value.Thus what one sees in poetry is not the quantum movement of semantic value from one valence to another, but the ordinary semantic value of a word at its point of obliteration.
I realize of course that this hypothesis is completely debatable, yet I believe that it might be useful, if treated provisionally.I do not claim that the univalent nature of a word is a transcendental, a-historical cohesion of sign, signifier and signified; rather, the univalent nature of a word emerges from a statistical aggregate of repeated usage, which later becomes conventionally and institutionally recognized.This evolution transpires over time, and thus the univalent semantic value is also bound up in time; the value resolves and dissolves, and in the interim achieves a relative fixity for a particular duration, which emerges from a complex interaction of "bottom-up" decentralized self-organization and "top-down" strategic intervention.Absolutely essential to the hypothesis above is a certain epistemological adjustment: i.e., instead of seeing the semantic value as "fixed," one must regard it as in a state of deceleration asymptotically approaching zero velocity, which thus gives the impression of fixity.Statistical aggregation around a mean usage invites a normative assessment, which later becomes conventional-cum-institutional usage, at the level of analysis of the latter, the sign becomes fixed-it reaches it velocity asymptotically closest to zero-and thus becomes "fixed" for a time.Therefore, if the speaker's use of the word is contemporaneous with the institutional semantic univalence of the word, and if the speaker employs this word with no pretense to poetic expression, then the word's significance is univalent.For instance, my ordinary use of the word "software" in a conversation with a member of technical support at Apple Computers is quite unambiguous, because I exist at a time when the word "software'-a word that has only recently "shed" its neologistic "skin"-is an institutional signifier denoting a particular signified: the body of code that enables my computer to perform certain functions.
A word's poetic usage, then, does not exist a priori as an alternative semantic potentiality; rather, poetic use indicates a point of intervention where a countersignifying force is applied to the word, which accelerates it so violently and abruptly that the instantaneous increase of momentum gained by the word obliterates the assemblages appended to it by the abstract machine.Therefore, the aporia instantiated by poetic usage is none other than that word's deterritorialization as a result of the countersignifying violence done to it.However, every deterritorialization of a sign is followed by its reterritorialization.Analysis of a sign's poetic usage thus becomes a matter of locating/discovering "the site" of its reterritorialization.

An Easy Climb
This is an engaging, down-to-earth book about the connections between Wittgenstein's aphoristic philosophy and some of the 20th-century writers who've followed his lead up the 'ladder of the ordinary.'Perloff's at her best with the close readings of difficult writers like Stein, Beckett and Creeley, who magically flower into comprehensibility under her sharp attention and good sense.

The authors she chooses to illustrate Wittgenstein's influence seemed a little arbitrary to me though.She admits that Beckett and Stein didn't read Wittgenstein, and that Wittgenstein would probably have disliked their art.So why put them 'under his sign'?It makes more sense to me to see Wittgenstein as part of a wider generation who felt dissatisfied with the pre-war language they'd inherited.With later poets like Silliman and Waldrop, who explicitly cite Wittgenstein's writings as an inspiration, I think Perloff misses what separates them from Wittgenstein:he had no earlier model to cite.Wittgenstein's faith in ordinary language led to a manner of writing and thinking that was largely self-sufficient--an interested reader can dive right in and think through the problems for herself.His more allusive postmodern heirs rely to a large extent on your prior knowledge of texts like Wittgenstein's for their effects.Where Wittgenstein himself struggled to keep his religious and hierarchical values in check through the discipline of ordinary language--concepts like beauty, God and the self seemed to have some meaning for him, you just couldn't talk about those meanings with language--later writers' easy acceptance of notions like a language game, the 'constructed self' and the fundamental indeterminacy of language seems to drain some of the drama from their writing.You don't feel the same struggle (or modesty) that you sense in Wittgenstein's open, user-friendly illustrations.Describing one of his poems, Ron Silliman writes:"Every sentence is supposed to remind the reader of his or her inability to respond."I can't imagine Wittgenstein saying something like that.

Still, the book is an interesting take on Wittgenstein and the poetic he unwittingly inspired.Well worth reading.

Perloff captures Wittgenstein's poetic insights.
Anyone interested in either Wittgenstein or poetry should read this book.It does a remarkably good job of both philosophical and literary analysis,making the case that poetry, like philosophy as conceived by Wittgenstein,embodies the curious collision of the mystical with the mundane which bestdemonstrates the limits of language.Tightly reasoned and methodical, thebook explains why Wittgenstein has had so much influence on aesthetic andethical projects of the Twentieth Century, and suggests why that willcontinue."The pursuit of the ordinary may well be the mostinteresting game in town." ... Read more

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In this slender volume Roger Pouivet advances an arresting argument. He asserts that the work of the later Wittgenstein can help us discern the lasting value of Thomas Aquinas's philosophical anthropology. He also holds that Aquinas can help the reader avoid an influential misreading of Wittgenstein. Pouivet draws on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Anthony Kenny to advance this twofold argument. His point of departure is Kenny's observation that “Wittgenstein's importance in the history of philosophy, and in particular of the philosophy of mind, lies especially in his criticism of the Cartesian framework within which philosophy and psychology had been conducted throughout the modern era, well beyond the critique of Kant. One sideeffect of Wittgenstein's liberation of philosophy from Cartesian prejudices is that it enables those who accept it to give a more ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Fabulous
This book opens interesting turf, trying to draw a circle around Wittgenstein and St. Thomas via Elizabeth Anscombe and others in her British circle who thought highly of both Ludwig and Thomas.

It's an odd stretch and very fun and simple to read.

Real Thomist
If you are a real Thomist, a Gilsonian Existential Thomist, then don't bother with this book. Pouivet attempts to apply modern epistemological categories to Aquinas. He assumes that knowledge is justified, true belief, whereas Aquinas' definition of knowledge is when the knower and the known become one. Pouivet's assumption about what knowledge is is predicated on the very Cartesian foundation to which he claims to be opposed. For Aquinas, there is no need for justification because, for Aquinas, the problems of modern epistemology do not arise. This book is not worth your time. ... Read more

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Continuum's Reader's Guides are clear, concise and accessible introductions to classic works of philosophy. Each book explores the major themes, historical and philosophical context and key passages of a major philosophical text, guiding the reader toward a thorough understanding of often demanding material. Ideal for undergraduate students, the guides provide an essential resource for anyone who needs to get to grips with a philosophical text. Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" - the only book he actually published within his lifetime - was an immensely important work, which changed the direction of philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. Highlighting the importance of the nature of language in philosophy and the problematic nature of metaphysics, it strongly influenced the work of Russell, the Vienna Circle and A. J. Ayer. An understanding of the ideas in the "Tractatus" is essential to fully grasp Wittgenstein's remarkable thought. In "Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus': A Reader's Guide", Roger White provides a thorough account of the philosophical and historical context of Wittgenstein's work.The book provides a detailed outline of the themes and structure of the text, guiding the reader towards a thorough understanding of this remarkable text. White goes on to explore the reception and influence of the work and offers a detailed guide to further reading. This is the ideal companion to study of this hugely important philosophical work. ... Read more

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very helpful
I'm studying Wittgenstein for my doctoral comps (in philosophy), and I must say, not only is this book extremely clear and helpful, it might be the best secondary source on Wittgenstein that I've read.The author stays even-handed and open about his premises, expositing the text with brilliance and clarity. ... Read more

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An indispensible resource, this collection of Wittgenstein's key shorter works -- in some cases expanded and corrected -- offers the full German text of those selections originally written in German. Highlights include 'Notes for the 'Philosophical Lecture', an essay on private language and experience, published here for the first time; an emended version of the crucially important 'Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data'; and 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough', Wittgenstein's ground-breaking critique of Frazer's classic study of magic and religion. Fifteen selections that span the development of Wittgenstein's thought, his wide range of interest, and his methods of philosophical investigation offer subtle insights into the character and personality of their author. Included are reflections on ethics, language, logic, experience, culture, anthropology, the nature of philosophy, aesthetics, and mathematics. Together they take us a step closer toward an accurate and rounded picture of the lifelong philosophical activity of one of the most intriguing philosophers of the twentieth century. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Important Collection
This is an important collections of texts by Wittgenstein. For those interested in Wittgenstein and ethics, the lecture on ethics printed here may be significant. This book also contains Wittgenstein's remarks onFrazer's Golden Bough, which is important when one wants to understandWittgenstein's views on religion and culture. However, the most importantthing here is probably some remarks printed under the heading"Philosophy", where Wittgenstein spells out his views onphilosophy. If one wants to get a clear grasp on the later Wittgenstein'sview on philosophy, this piece is very important. The reader will recognizepassages from Philosophical Investigations, but here Wittgenstein'sphilosophical therapy is stated even more clearly than in theInvestigations.

Important Collection
This is an important collections of texts by Wittgenstein. For those interested in Wittgenstein and ethics, the lecture on ethics printed here may be significant. This book also contains Wittgenstein's remarks onFrazer's Golden Bough, which is important when one wants to understandWittgenstein's views on religion and culture. However, the most importantthing here is probably some remarks printed under the heading"Philosophy", where Wittgenstein spells out his views onphilosophy. If one wants to get a clear grasp on the later Wittgenstein'sview on philosophy, this piece is very important. The reader will recognizepassages from Philosophical Investigations, but here Wittgenstein'sphilosophical therapy is stated even more clearly than in theInvestigations. ... Read more

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On October 25, 1946, in a crowded room in Cambridge, England, the great twentieth-century philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper came face to face for the first and only time. The meeting -- which lasted ten minutes -- did not go well. Their loud and aggressive confrontation became the stuff of instant legend, but precisely what happened during that brief confrontation remained for decades the subject of intense disagreement.

An engaging mix of philosophy, history, biography, and literary detection, Wittgenstein's Poker explores, through the Popper/Wittgenstein confrontation, the history of philosophy in the twentieth century. It evokes the tumult of fin-de-siécle Vienna, Wittgentein's and Popper's birthplace; the tragedy of the Nazi takeover of Austria; and postwar Cambridge University, with its eccentric set of philosophy dons, including Bertrand Russell. At the center of the story stand the two giants of philosophy themselves -- proud, irascible, larger than life -- and spoiling for a fight. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (101)

Vienna, the home of the two philosophers
A very amusing book even for Austrians learning more about the historical and social background of two famous Austrian philosophers unknown to most of the folk here. The benefits of the education experiments of both of them are unfortunately not visible, even if there is a Sir Karl Popper School in Vienna.
Very amusing also, how Austrians are seen from the outside world. No - not amusing but interesting.

btw.: You cannot visit the Wittgenstein Palais in Vienna to understand, how he is grown up and educated. The Palais has been destroyed and replaced by an ugly building.
And:we (the Austrians) don't drink Okacimer beer whatever the author mismatched this with (maybe the 16th district Ottakringer beer).

But anyway a very good way to get familiar with the most important philosophers of the 20th century and a perfect book to start some further reading from all the participants of that short meeting at H3.

Love Believes the Resurrection
Fascinating stuff. It is not serious philosophy; more of a comment on the culture of early 20th philosophy and the concomitant conflicts; plus a most interesting revelation on the critical value of eyewitness testimony in historical research despite ambiguities.

This kind of work requires the synthesis of great research and creative perspective. They authors take a 10 minute incident, an incident highlighting the the ancient and ongoing 'one/many' problem, and create an engaging read.

The conflicts between Wittgenstein and Popper are not new. These date to Heraclitus/Parmenides, Aristotle/Plato, Epicurus/Epictetus, Aquinas/Augustine, Berkeley/Spinoza.

Great insight into the personal development in these diverse personalities. The complex blend of nature/nurture (one/many!) to produce a Wittgenstein on the one hand and a Popper on the other.

Wittgenstein's puzzles intrigue me. Popper's ambitious project inspires me. Yet...

One disappointing omission. Though a popular work, the authors could have dug a bit deeper. After the puzzles, Wittgenstein had other preoccupations:

"What inclines even me to believe in Christ's Resurrection? It is as though I play with the thought. -- If he did not rise from the dead, then he decomposed in the grave like any other man. He is dead and decomposed. In that case he is a teacher like any other and can no longer help; and once more we are orphaned and alone. So we have to content ourselves with wisdom and speculation. We are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing but dream, roofed in, as it were, and cut off from heaven. But if 1 am to be really saved, - what I need is certainty -- not wisdom, dreams or speculation -- and this certainty is faith- And faith is faith in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative intelligence. For it is my soul with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, that has to be saved, not my abstract mind. Perhaps we can say: Only love can believe the Resurrection- Or: It is love that believes the Resurrection. We might say: Redeeming love believes even in the Resurrection; holds fast even to the Resurrection." (Wittgenstein/Winch, "Culture and Value.")

The authors missed this part of Wittgenstein. Who'd have thunk? (But even Heraclitus needed a 'logos' and Nietzsche needed 'eternal recurrence'!)

True hope is beyond the one/many: Love believes the resurrection of Jesus!

Ring of Fire
"Wittgenstein's Poker" is a fascinating exploration of the (in)famous debate between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper, 20th century philosophers whose ideas have informed the post-modern philosophy of today. Both were Austrian Jews who had fled to the safety of England. Both struggled with their identities as Jews in a hostile environment. While Popper was from the middle class, Wittgenstein was an aristocrat. Popper was happily married; Wittgenstein struggled with being gay. Popper thought philosophy tackled real problems, Wittgenstein thought philosophy resulted from linguistic misunderstandings.

"Wittgenstein's Poker" is engrossing in its biographies of both men, as well as their dramatic confrontation. It is an adventure of ideas. It's also good as an introduction to the philosophies of Popper and Wittgenstein, inviting further exploration. "Wittgenstein's Poker" sets the mind on fire.

Evaporation of Problem vs. Puzzle
This is a fascinating read of a supposed ten-minute exchange between two great philosophers.One wanted to contest the gist of philosophy being puzzles, the other a defense of such.In this verbal sparring that supposedly went on at a university moral society club meeting, what actually occurred in this ten minutes has been under dispute ever since.The authors do a fine job of providing background for the reader to get caught up in this debate, providing backgrounds of lifes of the two involved, Wittgenstein and Popper, as well as other influential thinkers there that day, as well as academic setting, etc.

I react towards the amount of philosophy of this encounter that they provide just enough to allow the reader outside this area of expertise enough to have some insight into the highly charged meeting of these two great thinkers.One can always delve more into their writings and also into the history of philosophy if desired.

I titled this review by pulling the alleged polarity between the two thinkers wrapped around the authors' summation of which of the two won?:"The battle was not over, neither won nor lost; it had simply evaporated."

Great fun as an introduction or a refresher
Wittgenstein's Poker is a journalistic account of a short debate between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper, refereed by Bertran Russell and several other philosophers. Over the years the debate has become legendary among philosophers, with several different accounts of what occurred that evening.

The authors summarize the debate in the 20th Chapter entitled "Slum Landlords and Pet Aversions". Popper went to the meeting "hoping to provoke Wittgenstein into defending the view that there are no genuine philosophical problems...." Wittgenstein broke into Popper's presentation asserting the non-existence of problems; there are only puzzles. Popper countered with infinity [just mathematics according o Wittgenstein], induction [logic, not philosophy] and causation.

Popper argued that Wittgenstein's assertion that there are only puzzles is a philosophical claim, which itself is a philosophical problem, perhaps the only philosophical problem, but a problem nonetheless. Wittgenstein recognized the force of this proposition and remained silent; "Whereof one can not speak, thereof one must remain silent."

The poker comes into the debate when Wittgenstein picks it up and waves it about. Controversy swirls over Wittgenstein's intent: a physical attack on Popper, a method of emphasizing his points, relief from intense emotions?

Whatever the purpose, all participants agree that Wittgenstein left the meeting. Edmonds and Eidinow are left to put this short debate into the fascinating and complicated history of the two Austrian philosophers and their interaction in post war Cambridge. The human stories bring Popper, Wittgenstein and others to life in a very satisfying manner.

Having read all of the Amazon reviews, and several others, it appears the reader will have very different reactions depending on their own philosophical training. A general reader will find many of the puzzles, rather problems [puzzles?, problems?] interesting but not essential to the human stories. Well trained philosophers will accept or reject the book depending on their own positions on Russell, Popper, Wittgenstein I, or Wittgenstein II.

At one time, I was deeply involved in symbolic logic, worshiping Russell's work and struggling with the argument that a yellow sun was some proof for the proposition that all ravens are black. The book recharged my excitement over those logical and philosophical studies, but served, even more, to make these important philosophers come alive.

All in all, this was a very satisfying journey, chaotic in part, but proving one of Wittgenstein's lessons: "I know that queer things happen in this world. It's one of the few things I've really learned in my life."

Robert C. Ross2008 ... Read more

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This fourth and final volume of the monumental commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations covers pp 428-693 of the book. Like the previous volumes, it consists of philosophical essays and exegesis. ... Read more

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' Agenerous, careful and clearly argued book... whichdeserves a very wide circulation, and could serve as the prototype for a whole new genre of analysis in politically theory.'--Stephen E. Toulmin, American Political Science Review ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

The best explication of Wittgenstein!
In my study of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the one book I have found to be the most helpful was Pitkin's.Perhaps because she works through the implications of Wittgenstein's radical philosophy for a particular set of conundra.She weaves together a tapestry from, it seems, a 1000 sources.Her use of source is amazing.Her quotes from Cavell's book are better than the book itself; that is, the bits and pieces she picks, and the order and context she provides for them, is far more coherent than the book itself.The same could be said for her presentation of Wittgenstein, of whom it could never be said that he explained his ideas clearly.Nevertheless, he got it right, and to this day few apreciate the fullness of his critique of modern philosophy or its implications.Pitkin does. ... Read more

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Anscombe guides us through the Tractatus and, thereby, Wittgenstein’s early philosophy as a whole. She shows in particular how his arguments developed out of the discussions of Russell and Frege. This reprint is of the fourth, corrected edition. ... Read more

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The reviewer who mentions the irony of Wittgentstein and Anscombe's friendship is incorrect.
Throughout most of his adult life, Wittgenstein flirted with conversion to the Catholic faith.Don't read the Tractatus and fall into the naive trap of logical positivism.Wittgenstein was above all concerned with fighting the modern, secular worldview and promoting a religious one.Though he did not explicitly endorse scripturual stories as literal truth, he was concerned to promote a worldview in which questions about value were taken seriously and not dismissed as unscientific superstition.

Anscombe is a good interpreter and capable of understanding Wittgenstein, though not for the lay reader.

Introduction to Contemporary Classic
Gertrude Anscombe's "An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus", originally published in 1959 discusses Wittgenstein's early twentieth century classic.Anscombe is herself is an accomplished philosopher and respected Wittgenstein commentator.

This short work (although longer than the Tractatus) discusses Wittgenstein's early thoughts on a range of concepts pertinent to understanding the Tractatus, e.g. formal logic, language etc.In looking at Wittgenstein she examines his work in light of his contemporaries Frege and Russell.From my perspective, given the austereness of the Tractatus, this latter point is particularly important to understanding Wittgenstein (in many ways he represents the culmination of their work in logic).Without some historic context (perhaps even with it) the Tractatus can seem pedantic.

Despite its strengths, however, I think that Anscombe's text offers little for the non-expert Wittgenstein reader.To improve it in this regard a limited discussion of late nineteenth century idealism may be helpful - given that the extreme analytical approach taken by Frege and company seems in part a reaction to Hegelian idealism.Wittgenstein can seem almost impenetrable and times and a guide to his work can be helpful.Unfortunately, in this effort Anscombe is as opaque as the master and provides limited assistance.

Overall, Anscombe's work is a solid commentary.I do not think, however, that it offers much to the reader who is not versed in Wittgenstein thought.From my point of view, Russell's introduction to the original English translation of the Tractatus is much superior in situating the work for the uninitiated.

Silent speaks ( by Ludwig Wittgenstein )
Leading this book is an Introduction from his contemporary
Bertand Russell,who states "the book is considered an important
event in the philosophical world."
Lidwig begins with "Philosophyis not a theory but an activity"
from his Opus (1921).
He starts off the book dealing with symbolism and words,then
states that their are four main points:
Theory of knowledge
Principals of physics
Ethics
Mystical
Starting with the last page opens up your mind and gives it a

fresh look in understanding all he says.
"My propositions are elucidatory in this way:he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has
climbedout through them, on them, over them.(He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
Where one cannot speak, therefore one must be silent."

Let go of any begining ideas and let his ideas flow through you.

Sandra Daftarian/Jan.2002 ... Read more

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This is a superlative graphic guide described as 'warm, witty and wise' by Jonathan Ree to an enigmatic master of twentieth-century philosophy. ... Read more

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This book explores Wittgenstein's long engagement with the work of the pragmatist William James.In contrast to previous discussions, Russell Goodman argues that James exerted a distinctive and pervasive positive influence on Wittgenstein's thought. He shows that both share commitments to anti-foundationalism, to the description of the concrete details of human experience, and to the priority of practice over intellect. Considering in detail what Wittgenstein learnt from his reading of William James, Goodman provides considerable evidence for Wittgenstein's claim that he is saying "something that sounds like pragmatism." ... Read more

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This revised edition of Sir Anthony Kenny’s classic work on Wittgenstein contains a new introduction which covers developments in Wittgenstein scholarship since the book was first published.

• Widely praised for providing a lucid and historically informed account of Wittgenstein’s core philosophical concerns.
  
• Demonstrates the continuity between Wittgenstein’s early and later writings.
  
• Provides a persuasive argument for the unity of Wittgenstein’s thought.
  
• Kenny also assesses Wittgenstein’s influence in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Customer Reviews (2)

Incredibly confusing
I don't know why anyone would think that this book is "clear" or good for beginners. I'm taking a class on Wittgenstein where we've had to read a couple of chapters of this, and every page is a struggle. Maybe I'm just dense, but Kenny chooses to focus on all the wrong things in setting up the background to Wittgenstein's thought in the work of Frege and Russell... he spends an unnecessary amount of time on how Frege tried to reduce arithmetic to logic (which is not really Wittgenstein's focus), but meanwhile spends only a paragraph or two on Russell's theory of types. For another example, the explanation of of the critical concept of the distinction between "saying" and "showing" in chapter 3 is incredibly difficult to understand in Kenny's account of it, when really, once one figures it out, it is straightforward in my opinion. But I had to consult a number of other sources to figure it out, because Kenny's explanation was so garbled.

If you need an introductory book on Wittgenstein, I recommend instead "Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction" by A.C. Grayling, which does a much better job of telling you in clear language the philosophical background you need to know to understand Wittgenstein.

Excellent
This book started with some bio and then some basic logic (!), which I felt was condescending, but I quickly changed my mind when it became clear how important this was to understanding the Tractatus and W.'s later works.There are real insights in this book, i.e., it isn't just a basic introduction.
Furthermore, Kenny does an outstanding job of making it all clear in straightforward prose.He doesn't latch on to catch phrases or assume you are already a Wittgensteinian.He simply spells out the evolution of W.'s thought in a clear and precise way.
This is just good scholarship, whatever you may think of his interpretation at the end of reading it. ... Read more

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In over 90 entries, this lucid and accessible dictionary explains technical terms that Wittgenstein introduced into the philosophical debate or transformed substantially, and also topics that play a central role in his work. It delineates Wittgenstein's line of argument, its strength and problems, and sheds light on fundamental exegetical controversies. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Best book on W out there
Excellent work. Along with D.F. Pears's "The False Mirror", this "dictionary" is as in-depth and wide-ranging as we could hope. I tested it by looking up "logical objects", a rather minor topic from the Tractatus but one on which Wittgenstein made definitive criticisms of Frege and Russell. The entry was thorough and clear, and I used it countless times while studying the Tractatus and PI. An excellent work for those already familiar with Wittgenstein, and for those wrestling with his ideas for the first time alike.

A useful dictionary
Hans-Johann Glock har written a useful dictionary. For everyone writing about Wittgenstein, this volume is helpful. If one wonder whether one's interpretation of LW is reasonable or not and want to check with aprogressive scholar, the book is brilliant. Also, the dictionary is sothorough that it might teach you a lot about Wittgenstein. If you havequestions concerning Wittgenstein's views on the autonomy of language,grammar, religion, rule-following, private language etc, you should getthis book. ... Read more

Product Description
Wittgenstein's relationship to skepticism has always been complex. It has even been argued in recent years that Wittgenstein can be best understood as an inheritor of scepticism. Wittgenstein and Scepticism is the first collection to explore this relationship and review our understanding of scepticism. Boasting a stellar collection of contributors, the essays in this volume address the nature of skepticism and Wittgenstein's approach in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and epistemology. Wittgenstein and Scepticism is a fascinating exploration of one of the most important philosophers. ... Read more