Customer Reviews (2)

Good Overview
Good history on this facinating region of North America. As an American, it made me want to visit this region.

Better than advertised
It's called "A Short History" but it's a big thick book with a lot more detail than I bargained for.

A little bit dry at times but generally very readable and informative. ... Read more

Book Description
Between Confederation and the Great Depression Quebec underwent a tremendous upheaval, transforming it from a rural, agricultural society to an urban, industrial one.

Widely acclaimed in its original French-language edition, this book is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of the period. The authors take an ecclectic approach, examining changes in the economic, social, political and cultural realms. They vividly portray the central conflicts of the period: the struggle between business and the Catholic church to determine economic and social development; the development of public welfare schemes in the face of growing urban squalour; the fight to maintain French language and culture in a society dominated by English-speaking businessmen and political leaders.

Illustrated with 15 maps and 190 photographs, Quebec: A History 1867-1929 offers a full examination of Quebec society during this period of rapid and deep change. ... Read more

Book Description

This book is the first comprehensive examination of the way French-speaking Quebecers have written about their past in the twentieth century. Rudin begins his study with Lionel Groulx, a professional historian who dominated the field for the first half of the century, and concludes with figures such as Paul-AndrT Linteau who occupy an important place in the discipline today.

Since historical writing reflects the society in which it was produced, Rudin's analysis offers new ways of thinking about Quebec society over the course of this century. He questions past interpretations of the careers of certain historians, dismissed for having been insufficiently professional to warrant serious attention. The dismissal of such historians has facilitated the belief, common in the profession, that historical writing in and about Quebec has constantly improved. Rudin challenges this received notion of continual progress by examining a group of historians who were remarkably similar, throughout the period, in their desire to abide by contemporary professional standards.

As a complementary volume to Carl Berger's The Writing of Canadian History, and as a new, critical reading of Quebec historiography, this book will stimulate considerable debate in the historical community. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

history live!
This book helps me to get a first a view of Canada-Quebec relations history in a very lively way which never bored me although I was discovering the subject. It shows the "problematique" of thesubject and by presenting the different point of views it enables thereader to appreciate its complexity. ... Read more

Book Description
'What a scene!' wrote Horace Walpole. 'An army in the night dragging itself up a precipice by stumps of trees to assault a town and attack an enemy strongly entrenched and double in numbers!' It was indeed a drama that required no embellishment as Major-General James Wolfe and his men scaled the cliffs above the St. Lawrence to stand at daybreak upon the Plains of Abraham with the capital of French Canada before them; and then in one short sharp exchange of fire to tumble the Marquis de Montcalm's French army into bloody ruin. Sir John Fortescue famously described that exchange as the 'most perfect volley ever fired on a battlefield', and while that contention may be disputed, there is no doubt that in just a few hectic minutes one of the British Army's most consummate professional soldiers quite literally beat the King's enemies before breakfast and in so doing decided the fate of a continent. The battle fought on the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec on the morning of 13 September 1759 is deservedly one of the most famous in British military history and filled with dramatic incident. Yet it is also a controversial battle clouded on the one hand by imperial myth and on the other by the near outraged denunciations of those historians who contend that because Wolfe broke the rules he really had no right to win his great victory and posthumous reputation. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Not as Good as Chartrand's Volume
Four years ago, the very capable historian Rene Chartrand wrote Osprey's Quebec 1759 in the Order of Battle series.Now, Osprey has decided to publish a campaign title on the same subject by author Stuart Reid.Chartrand's earlier volume was so comprehensive that it seems a waste of time to recover this same ground, and the only value added in this new volume are the 3-D maps and the battle scenes (which frankly, are not very good).Indeed, Reid's Quebec 1759 accomplishes much less in the same 96-page format than Chartrand.

Quebec 1759: The Battle that Won Canada begins with a short introduction, a campaign chronology, and a very brief section on opposing commanders.The section on opposing armies borrows heavily from Chartrand's earlier volume, although the author neglected to discuss the Royal Navy's participation.The section on opposing plans is also rather brief.There are a total of five 2-D maps (the Canadian theater of operations, the river war in June-August 1759, the proposed St Michel Operation, the landing at Montmorency on 31 July 1759, and the landing at Foulon) and three 3-D Bird's Eye View maps (two of the Battle on the Plains of Abraham and one of the Battle of St Foy in April 1760).The three battle scenes are: the landing at Montmorency, the storming of the Foulon and the Battle on the Plains); however,the battle scenes in this volume, by artist Gerry Embleton, are not as good as in most other Osprey volumes.

Reid is a British re-enactor with considerable insight into the 18th Century British Army, which he showed to good effect in his earlier books on Culloden.However, Reid has a tendency toward a jingoistic, pro-British bias that can be annoying.In the introduction, Reid takes the time to criticize George Washington's "inept leadership" on the Monongahela four years earlier, while noting that the British General Braddock was merely "unfortunate."This biased opinion does not square with the facts.Reid also infers several times that Wolfe was fortunate in having virtually no colonial troops in his command at Quebec (although he could have mentioned that many British units were brought up to strength by men recruited in America).Reid's recurrent dismissal of French General Montcalm's military talents also seems overtly jaded; wasn't this the same Montcalm who defeated the British at Fort Ticonderoga?The subtitle, "the battle that won Canada" also betrays a narrow interpretation of that event; the French would see it as "the battle that lost Canada."Reid is certainly knowledgeable about the kit and tactics of British infantry in this period, but his objectivity - or lack of - is a cause for concern.

The only other noticeable difference between Reid and Chartrand is that the former bases much of his narrative on the letters of General Wolfe and other official British correspondence.There are virtually no sources quoted from the French perspective.Reid's discussion of the development of Wolfe's final battle plan is a bit tortuous, as most other attempts at analyzing the young general's decision-making process tend to wallow through a sea of assumptions and guesses.No matter whom you read, it is clear the Wolfe arrived at Quebec with only a hazy plan of action (based on ridiculously bad intelligence) and then decided to play it by ear.The landing at Montmorency was a disaster that demonstrated how effective Montcalm's area defense was, as well as the paucity of British tactical options.Wolfe's decision to land below the city was anticipated by the French and most British writers fail to mention just how narrow a margin of error the landing at Foulon was conducted. Wolfe got very lucky and got ashore in strength, but had the French been a bit more alert, the landing at Foulon would have been a replay of Montmorency.While the capture of Quebec in 1759 was certainly a great British victory, it was based far more on luck than good operational planning. ... Read more

Book Description
First published in 1994, this book offers a brief history of Quebec and the idea of a Quebec nation from 1740 to the time of publication.

The story is told through conversations between journalist Gilles Gougeon and seven noted Quebec historians. At a time when many Quebec nationalists continue to believe that they are close to achieving the goal of sovereignty that they have sought for more than two centuries, English Canadians can see for themselves how Quebec historians view their own history.

A bestseller in Quebec, A History of Quebec Nationalism has successfully explained the history of Quebec nationalism and its champions to Quebec readers. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Interesting but incomplete
Dr. Mann Trofimenkoff's history of Quebec is a fascinating read for anyone interested in Quebec or French Canada.Her analysis of the underlying intellectual and social conditions that frame major historical moments makes the book a pleasurable read for all of its 300+ pages.Of particular interest is Mann's thorough and conscientious mapping of women's roles in the history of Quebec, a quality lacking in other popular and scholarly historical works on the province.Though no one book can do everything, the single greatest shortcoming of the book is the absence of a meaningful discussion of the profound antisemitism and clericly led fascist movements in Quebec of the early 20th century.The chapters on that period deal with several important themes but Mann, who is clearly well-versed in the region's history, seems to have chosen to ignore these phenomena, giving precedence to other spheres of social and intellectual history at the time. ... Read more

Book Description
The American attack on Quebec in 1775 was a key episode in the build-up to the War of Independence. Capture of the city would give the Americans control of Canada - a strategic disaster for the British. In May 1775 Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point, but Congress only reluctantly supported proceeding to a full invasion of Canada. Still, Arnold was permitted to lead an expedition to Quebec across modern-day Maine. However, during the 350-mile trek through largely uninhabited wilderness 300 men turned back, while another 150 deserted or died of disease - just 650 reached Quebec. The American siege continued until May, when the thaw brought British reinforcements and relief. More American defeats followed, and soon the British controlled Lake Champlain, but delays in building the fleet had left them insufficient time to recapture Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga. The Americans were forced to permanently abandon their hopes of bringing Canada into their war of rebellion. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Benedict Arnold's Finest Hour
The American invasion of Canada in 1775 rarely gets much coverage in American history for a variety of reasons.Americans like to think of their forefathers defending home and hearth against British tyranny, spearheaded by the dreaded Redcoats, not invading a territory that did not want to be part of their new nation.The fact that the campaign also ended in ignominious failure further discourages attention.However perhaps the greatest impediment to American study of this important but neglected campaign is the fact that the hero of the hour was none other than Benedict Arnold, the most despised figure in American history.Brendan Morrissey, the British PR consultant who did three earlier volumes for Osprey on the American Revolution, brings the Quebec campaign into sharp focus in Osprey's Campaign #128.In particular, this volume on Quebec 1775 would also make a useful campaign study for military officers.

Quebec 1775 begins with a 5-page introduction that provides background on the Quebec Act, a four-page section on the geography, people and political issues and a campaign chronology. The sections on opposing commanders and opposing forces are decent, but Morrissey provides no order of battle for either side (in particular, he omits British ground and naval forces in Nova Scotia).The campaign narrative itself is 60 pages long, and includes separate sections on the initial battles, Arnold's journey across the Maine wilderness, the American retreat from Canada and the Battle of Valcour Island.The author also provides an interesting section on the battlefields today and an annotated bibliography.The campaign narrative is supported by five 2-D maps (North America and the Quebec Act; Lower Canada on the eve of war; Montgomery's advance into Canada; Arnold's march to Quebec; Sullivan's retreat from Canada), three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (the siege of St Johns; the attack on Quebec; the Battle of Valcour Island) and three color battle scenes (the siege of St Johns; Arnold is wounded at Quebec; the Hesse Hanau artillery in action at Valcour Island).All in all, the graphic presentations are effective and make this volume a useful supplement to any study of early military operations in the American Revolution.

Morrissey is a good storyteller and he relates the facts of the campaign with both precision and accuracy.However, Morrissey does not really attempt any military analysis and readers should be cautioned to treat the authors' opinion with some circumspection.Throughout the text, Morrissey defends Major General Sir Guy Carleton, the British commander in Canada, from accusations of over-caution and even timidity.Yet it is pretty obvious that the British army in Canada had gotten into a peacetime rut after nine years of quiet garrison duty in Montreal and neither the troops or commanders were up to the demands of mobile warfare.Carleton's decision to commit the bulk of his regulars to a "die-in-place" mission at St. Johns on the border rather than to conduct a delay or launch a spoiling attack was a major mistake.Indeed, the passivity of the British regulars in the first six months of the campaign is truly amazing - they virtually sat immobile and then just fell over like ninepins at the first strike - and it goes a long way toward explaining American initial successes.Morrissey considers the siege of St Johns as a valiant effort that delayed the American invasion for two months but the defense did not save Montreal from occupation and Arnold did not reach Quebec until nearly two weeks after the surrender of St Johns.With the loss of Montreal and nearly 70% of the British regulars in Canada at the cost of fewer than 200 American casualties, the British were on the verge of losing in weeks what had taken years of hard fighting to conquer in the Seven Years War.

Like most historians, Morrissey goes along with the notion that the American assault on Quebec on New Years Eve 1775 was foredoomed to failure.Granted, the Americans were attacking a fortified position held by an enemy that outnumbered them 2-1, but Morrissey does not credit the American advantages in morale and maneuver warfare.The British rag-tag force of militia (French and English), sailors and a few remaining regulars was willing to wait behind their defenses and they were commanded by men who leaned toward caution.Arnold and Daniel Morgan, the commander of the riflemen, typified the aggressive and anything-is-possible type mentality that represented the real military capability of the American patriots in 1775-1776.Morrissey fails to note that the American plan of attack - a pincer effort - was fairly sophisticated and came fairly close to success.Had the Americans made more effort in dealing with the British obstacle plan, the defenses might have been breached and the polyglot British force probably would have surrendered (certainly the Canada militia would probably have decided not to risk their lives for the British).As it was, the failure of the attack and the loss of much of the American army did not entice the slightest aggressiveness from Carleton.

After leading the New Years Eve attack with Richard Montgomery and being wounded, Arnold remained in Canada to rally the now-dispirited Americans.Once British reinforcements arrived in 1776 and the American army began to retreat, Morrissey notes that Arnold was the last American soldier to leave Canada. Arnold then threw himself into the construction of a fleet on Lake Champlain and fought the Battle of Valcour Island that helped to delay a British counter-invasion of northern New York. All in all, Arnold's performance in the Quebec campaign between May 1775 and October 1776 was one of the amazing displays of dynamic tactical leadership ever seen by an American commander.Unfortunately, as Medal of Honor winner "Pappy" Boyington once said, "show me a hero and I'll show you a bum," it was never more true than in the case of Arnold.

superb
I have alwasy been an admirer of the American revolution. It was this nation's greatest war, as well as being the war in which this nation was born.

Just as I have been an admirer of Osprey Publishers for the quality they produce in their books.

Brendan Morrissey is one of the most facinating of their writers. Because here is an Englishman writing so well about battles in a war his country lost, without putting in a single sour word.And though I still think ins work Boston 1775 is his best so far, Quebec 1775 is pretty good. Since it gives a good view to a campain that took place during the crucial early phase of this war, in which had anything gond different, we might still be part of the Commonwealth, Though we would be controling it.

I enjoyed this book. ... Read more

Book Description
A detailed examination of women's lives on Quebec from the early seventeenth century until the end of the '70's. ... Read more

Book Description
Jarrett Rudy argues that while people smoked for highly personal reasons, their smoking rituals were embedded in social relations and shaped by dominant norms of taste and etiquette. The Freedom to Smoke examines the role of the tobacco industry, health experts, churches, farmers, newspapers, the military, the state, and smokers themselves. A pioneering city-based study, it weaves Western understandings of respectable smoking through Montreal's diverse social and cultural fabric. Rudy argues that etiquette gave smoking a political role, reflecting and serving to legitimize beliefs about inclusion, exclusion, and hierarchy that were at the core of a transforming liberal order. ... Read more