Product Description
What is consciousness and how is it related to the natural world? The essays in this volume address this question from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of mind, a new trend that integrates phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and cognitive science. The guiding principles of this new thinking is that precise and detailed phenomenological accounts of subjective experience are needed if significant progress is to be made in understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world. From this standpoint, the essays collected here explore a variety of nuances concerning consciousness,. perception, schizophrenia, empathy and intersubjectivity. Also addresses are fascinating methodological issues involving the relationship between phenomenology and other approaches to understanding the mind in science and philosophy. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

The perfect companion to Sellars' essay
If you have struggled, like many of us have, to understand Sellars' essay, this is the book for you.

I worked through Sellars' essay using this book as a companion volume, and it was incredibly helpful.

Why does this single essay deserve a guide? First, because of its importance. In this essay you will find precursors to many modern strands of thought, such as the 'language of thought' hypothesis, coherence theories of justification, and even pragmatic theories of meaning.

Unfortunately, the essay is also very difficult to understand. Sellars assumed working familiarity with the main currents in philosophy as understood by a philosopher in the 1950s. He also assumes familiarity with historical figures such as Kant. Finally, even if you have said familiarity, the essay is dense and sometimes uses rather tortured prose that can be very difficult to understand.

So, if you find yourself stumbling to understand 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', buy this book immediately. You will be very glad you did. It is extremely clearly written, and it removes the requirement that you have a degree in philosophy to understand Sellars' seminal essay.

Sellars and Clarity
This is a good book which would serve well as an introduction to Sellars's dense "EPM."It provides background information on sense-datum theories, a contextual overview, clarification (i.e., shows the arguments) in each section of the text, and offers insightful commentary on each section."EPM" is included at the end of the text.

I highly recommend this book, along with Sellars's other work, and McDowell's Mind and World.

what is this all about?
the commentary writers are offering here is crowded with the details of Sellar's essay and quite at no point supplies a general foothold to make Sellar's work and what's original in it understandable (which I finally can not appreciate how philosophically original it is). ... Read more

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Could a computer have a mind? What kind of machine would this be? Exactly what do we mean by "mind" anyway?

The notion of the "intelligent'"machine, while continuing to feature in numerous entertaining and frightening fictions, has also been the focus of a serious and dedicated research tradition. Reflecting on these fictions, and on the research tradition that pursues "Artificial Intelligence", raises a number of vexing philosophical issues.Minds and Computers offers an engaging, coherent, and highly approachable interdisciplinary introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.

Readers are presented with introductory material from each of the disciplines which constitute Cognitive Science: Philosophy, Neuroscience, Psychology, Computer Science, and Linguistics. Throughout, readers are encouraged to consider the implications of this disparate and wide-ranging material for the possibility of developing machines with minds. And they can expect to develop a foundation for philosophically responsible engagement with A.I., a sound understanding of Philosophy of Mind and of computational theory, and a good feel for cross-disciplinary analysis.

Features:

*A solid foundation in the Philosophy of Mind

*A broadly interdisciplinary purview

*A directed philosophical focus

*A clear and accessible explanation of technical material with abundant exercises

*A glossary of terms

Customer Reviews (1)

A first-rate introduction to the computational theory of mind
If you are looking for a comprehensive interdisciplinary overview of the core concepts of cognitive science lucidly presented in a couple of hundred pages, seek no more. Matt Carter accomplishes just that by examining the relation between minds and computers, a goal which takes him beyond the bounds of conventional artificial intelligence. In addition to classical AI, Carter ably discusses the fundamental ideas of philosophy of mind, psychology and behaviorism, neuroscience, computational intelligence, and linguistics: the fields constituting cognitive science. The aim of this grand tour is to facilitate development of a philosophically sound computational theory of mind.

The tour begins, quite properly, in the very beginning with a review of Cartesian dualism followed by concise discussions of behaviorism, neuroanatomy, Australian (or reductive) materialism, and functionalism. The classical symbolic computational architecture thesis of AI is then examined in some detail. Subsequent chapters delve into particular issues of interest, including computationalism, standard AI search techniques, machine and human reasoning, machine and human language, and artificial neural networks. Even automated game playing, a perennial AI favorite, gets a little chapter of its own. Classic AI icons are, of course, showcased: the Turing test, expert systems, the Chinese room. Alas, 200-odd pages impose severe limits; thus Minsky and Simon and Newell and McCarthy and many other legendary heavyweights don't even make it into the footnotes. Actually, there are no footnotes. Nor endnotes. But there are excellent suggestions for further reading and a very helpful glossary in the appendices.

This book is simply wonderful. It's everything you wanted to know about cog sci delivered under the label of AI. That is fine. It was, after all, good old fashioned AI that got the ball rolling in the first place. Think of the book as a broad-based introduction to AI sans the messy programming requirements. Naturally, possession of an alert brain is de rigueur. ... Read more

Product Description
With questions on such topics as "Can you know that other people see red the way you do?" "How is it that you are the same person throughout your life, even though the cells of your body are continually changing?" and "Is it possible to survive one's bodily death?," this book aims to inspire students to work out solutions to fundamental philosophical problems for themselves. Animated by the hope that with prior opinions about a topic students will have a much easier time delving into the literature in this field, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND is filled with thought experiments as well as more concrete philosophical problems that arise in actual experiments in neuroscience and psychiatry. Not assuming any background in philosophy, the book is accessible to beginning students, but simultaneously, Montero's unique approach will prove thought provoking for students with prior background in the subject too.THE WADSWORTH PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS SERIES presents readers with concise, timely, and insightful introductions to a variety of traditional and contemporary philosophical subjects. With this series, students of philosophy will be able to discover the richness of philosophical inquiry across a wide array of concepts, including hallmark philosophical themes and themes typically underrepresented in mainstream philosophy publishing. Written by a distinguished list of scholars who have garnered particular recognition for their excellence in teaching, this series presents the vast sweep of today's philosophical exploration in highly accessible and affordable volumes. These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy. ... Read more

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In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This adverbial theory has the virtue of being both simple and systematic and is an important contribution to the philosophy of mind. ... Read more

Product Description
One of America's best-known philosophers offers asuccinct, easy-to-follow guide for applying philosophical theory toreal life.

Disillusionment with psychology is leading more and more people toformal philosophy for clues about how to think about life. But most ofus who try to grapple with concepts such as reality, truth, commonsense, consciousness, and society lack the rigorous training todiscuss them with any confidence. John Searle brings these notionsdown from their abstract heights to the terra firma of real-worldunderstanding, so that those with no knowledge of philosophy canunderstand how these principles play out in our everyday lives. Theauthor stresses that there is a real world out there to deal with, andcondemns the belief that the reality of our world is dependent on ourperception of it.

"A remarkable feat. This is the book for anyone who wants to learnabout the big philosophical questions."-Owen Flanagan, DukeUniversity

"This book is a major event. John Searle has brought together andelucidated forty years of brilliant work on Mind, Language, andSociety. Bravo!"-Jerome Bruner, New York UniversityAmazon.com Review
John Searle's summation of earlier writings is not just an essential tie-up volume for existing readers; it is also a perfect introduction to the work of one of the clearest heads in the philosophy of mind. Searle's book is a riposte to all those academics who make a career out of contradicting and complicating such default positions as the existence of an external reality, the reality of personal consciousness, and the reasonable fit of language to the perceived world. Certainly, we should examine these positions! But the first duty of philosophy, Searle argues, is that it should attempt to accommodate what is known. As far as we can tell, for example, consciousness is a biological product, but there is a long-running contention between the materialists--whose reductive descriptions of consciousness arrive, finally, at an embarrassed denial that consciousness exists at all--and the dualists, who cannot describe consciousness without evoking some supernatural involvement. Neither position is tenable--each offers some corrective to the other. The good explanation is in there somewhere, but the sheer intractability of the debate won't let it be expressed. In situations like this, Searle argues, it is always the terms that are wrong. Terms, mind you, that in this case include "matter," "mind," "physical," and "mental"! Searle--married as he is to common sense--is of necessity one of our most iconoclastic and creative thinkers. --Simon Ings, Amazon.co.uk ... Read more

Customer Reviews (26)

Cutting through all the mumbo jumbo about the mind
I can't imagine why I didn't write this review when I first read this outstanding book. In under 170 pages Searle gives the curious reader a complete overview of the mind and how it works, along with extensions to language and society. The only thing left is for neuroscience to figure out how the brain manages to do it.
Over the last few years we've been bombarded by the almost science fiction claims and speculations of cognitive science, which has a view of the mind that isn't any improvement over that of traditional religion.
Searle, on the other hand, gets right to the point, from showing the error of dualism, to explaining how the mind creates an objective social reality to how language works. While this subject could easily be intimidating, Searle writes as if he were explaining it to you over a beer at your favorite pub.
This is a well-written, delightful book, and one you will want to reread every few years.

Most of the criticisms are apt, but
...I like it anyway. I just really like John Searle's personality. Yes, he's smug, yes, despite being sloppy, yes, almost surely he sets up straw men quite regularly, and yes, he would definitely sneer at anyone who argued with him. If you disagree with Searle, probably you won't like him very much and if you do agree, you should probably be careful to check whether or not you like him because he's convincing or because he's reassuring. I just really like reading his books and articles for their vast power to entertain.

Chapter 1 is essentially an attack on post-modern nonsense. One of the things I love about Searle is that (like Carl Sagan, perhaps) he's interested in bringing down views that he deems preposterous, and can we argue that this isn't at least a little bit fun? One of my favorite books about the post-modern is "Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul De Man" by David Lehman. Next to Lehman, Searle is downright respectful of the opposition...though to be honest I judge Lehman's approach to be far more along the lines of what is deserved. Chapter 2 begins with a similar treatment of those in analytic philosophy who would embrace dualism or materialism. For about 50 pages, he's convincing, indeed moving in spots. Unfortunately, he sets the problem up far better than he "resolves" it. Indeed, for about 15 pages he blathers on about how consciousness is just "a biological phenomenon like any other" (only not like any other), and how once we realize this we won't be troubled by materialism, dualism, the threat of epiphenomenalism etc. I don't think there's an argument there anywhere, and certainly no one could be convinced or more probably even figure out what he means. However he does at least pause to "wrinkle his nose" at any approach that ignores natural selection (most writers on the mind-body problem avoid this entirely, which is almost surely catastrophic for their views), which I applaud. From there it's on to intentionality, social reality, language etc. in a similar vein.

Ultimately, the value of John Searle as a philosopher is not in any arguments he comes up with, but in the fact that his intuitions are extremely good--he almost always comes down on the right side of the fence. In short, he follows his nose, with an uncanny aptitude for finding what's most apt to wrinkle it at. More importantly, he's not afraid to do so, which I for one find damn refreshing.

Searle Summarized
In this short, readable book, John Searle gives an account of how minds, language, and social institutions are situated within a material universe.The account goes roughly like this:consciousness is a biological phenomena;conscious minds exhibit intentionality (i.e., the ability to refer to or "fit" the external world); and intentionality allows human minds to create social institutions and vest meaning in words.Searle transcends standard materialist and dualist positions in philosophy.He insists that mental, social, and linguistic phenomena must be explained in natural terms, but he does not try to "reduce" them to other categories or "explain" them out of existence.Along the way, he discusses a variety of issues ranging from realism to philosophical method.

A professor at UC Berkeley, Searle has a genius for cutting to the heart of a philosophical position and keeping his concepts tied to reality and common experience.He also writes so well that it's hard not to be carried along by his argument.At the same time, I never really bought his argument that consciousness is a purely biological category, especially after he conceded that "first person" conscious experiences cannot be reduced to "third person" facts about brains.Nor did I understand his account of how consciouness operates as a "macro" feature of the brain able to cause effects in "micro" features such as neurons.He draws an analogy with an automobile engine, where macro-features such as pistons and spark plugs have causal effects even though everything in the engine obeys the laws of subatomic physics.Unfortunately, the analogy doesn't convince: whatever else consciousness is, it doesn't seem to function like a piston.Searle blames our inability to see the force of his analogy on our cramped intuitions about causation.He doesn't provide any alternative intuitions.

It seems undeniable that conscious experience is constructed by material brains -- anyone who doubts this should read a few clinical essays by Oliver Sacks or A. R. Luria that describe the deformed consciousness of brain-injured patients.However, the mind also exhibits so many non-physical features that fitting it into "nature" may be harder than Searle lets on.The puzzle isn't solved -- just restated -- by insisting, "The mind is OBVIOUSLY real (so materialism is false), the mind is OBVIOUSLY part of the brain (so dualism is false), the mind OBVIOUSLY can cause effects in the brain (so epiphenomenalism is false)," and so forth.Maybe Searle is right that materialism and dualism are outmoded categories.Even so, consciousness is such a peculiar biological phenomenon, and so totally unlike any other process or feature of our bodies, that dualistic philosophies will inevitably emerge to account for it -- and will, in turn, spawn materialistic counter-philosophies aimed at resolving the paradoxes of dualism.The dualism/materialism debate may be sterile, but I doubt that Searle has brought it to an end.

None of these remarks should be taken as serious criticism of "Mind, Language, and Society," which covers a lot of ground beside the mind/body question.In only 150 pages or so, the book summarizes work Searle has published over the years in modern classics such as "The Rediscovery of the Mind," "Intentionality," and "The Construction of Social Reality."(In fact, I recall that Searle presented some of this material in undergraduate courses at Berkeley in the late 1970s.)Even though Searle doesn't discuss the free will problem or give equal time to opposing positions, his book is first-rate, and I definitely want to read it a second time.Anyone who has already taken a few introductory classes in philosophy and wants to probe deeper into the subject would benefit from reading it.

Searle is no scientist.
In this book Searle takes on the broad topics of scientific realism, the mind-body problem and the puzzle of socially constructed concepts (e.g. money), among other things.His goal seems to be to defend the "common sense" view on these topics, but as a philosopher he wants to do so rigorously.In this case, "rigorous" means mixing lots of specialized terminology with an otherwise breezy style, which has the overall effect of making him sound smug.His is a rare style that manages to convey that the author would sneer at any counterarguments to his positions; maybe this is because he stakes out his ground almost wholly by attacking the positions of others and deeming them obviously wrong.

What's worse, despite his fantastic reputation, his philosophy seems really sloppy to me.For example, he claims that "consciousness" is a definite non-physical property of the brain that has evolved.Then, he argues against epiphenomenalism by noting how implausible it would be that something so useful evolved while making no real difference.Seeing as how evolution is a physical theory, Searle seems to be arguing in circles.And that's about how the whole book is, seeing as how you have to buy into his mind-body "resolution" before you can even start pondering his ideas on the other stuff.

So, if you feel that invoking "the way it is like" to drink a glass of wine is a good philosophical argument for consciousness being non-physical and are already dead-certain that rocks have no such sensations, the you might find this book a reassuring read.

Personally, I think that to understand a proposition you have to also understand its negation.And while Searle claims to be an expert at characterizing what it is to be conscious, I have a hard time taking any of his "analysis" seriously, since he surely can't explain to me what it's like to be unconscious.

For those with a scientific bent, there are better authors out there covering similar material.In particular, I recommend "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience", by Max Bennet and PMS Hacker.Hacker makes sure the philosophy is reasonable, Bennet makes sure the science is accurate.Searle's book falls a little shy in both areas, which makes his smuggness all the more infuriating.

Excellent and Unorthodox Introduction to Philosophy
I'd like to note, first of all, that I didn't find Searle as uncharitable as some of the other reviewers here. He did give a few low blows, but I think his arguments appeared as straw-man's because rather than refute a lot of the other claims, he was integrating them subtly: dropping off parts which were unnecessary and then using the leftovers to create a greater and more encompassing theory. He never goes into depth of why he finds the parts of theories credible that he does, as this book is not intended for deep analysis. The reader must simply take Searle's word for it at times to understand what he is getting at (Searle does provide a nice "Further Reading" section at the end for readers who are more interested in the "why's" behind his arguments).

Which leads me into the content of his book...

This book is a modern introduction to more recent philosophical issues. Searle sums up in the first chapter most of the out-standing problems in the field that remain unsolved from the last few hundred years. These include the mind-body problem, skepticism, realism, and issues relating to consciousness such as binding and intentionality. Searle has an interesting perspective in that he tries to alleviate conflicts by "going behind the issue and merging premises." With this method he finds complete theories that integrate many perspectives that before seemed contradictory.

The writing of this book is not as thick as his other works. Most of his language is quite precise and his arguments are logically spelled out. The analogies are simple for easy understanding; more advanced readers will probably want to contemplate further implications of Searle's ideas than he discusses.

Searle is yet another voice in the last few decades that has shown a tendency towards integration to solve logical issues. This seems to be a trend with many other authors, and might be called the "leading edge" of philosophical thought right now. The book takes the reader from step one, and slowly builds up a view of reality that integrates mind, society, and language exquisitely.

And if you happen to be a proponent of one of the many theories Searle disagrees with, try to be patient, and see where he's going. He does use a condescending tone now and then. But other than that, recommended... ... Read more

Product Description
John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Excellent Modern Theory of Mind
P>In his usual manner, Searle tackles the problem of consciousness and how the mind works in this thorough examination of both classical and contemporary concerns. It's an exceedingly masterful task that is richly rewarding, if only slightly frustrating because of his poor syntactical structures.

Analytic philosophy is often difficult enough, and this book is of average difficulty, but when an author does not write clearly with near-run-on sentences, myandering and labyrinthine syntax, and in less than necessary obtuseness, it is a drawback. This is my only complaint.

Part of the problem is the author's, part reader's. Searle is going against the analytic grain by expositing a theory of mind that is at once novel and distinctive, clearing up confusions and ambiguities along the way. But these new ideas and the direction of fit they present are exciting and facinating, even if the presentation is less than perfect.

It's hard to imagine modern-day analytic philosophers going out on a limb with actual theory (they tend toward the criticism of others), so that it is refreshing that someone of Mr. Searle's reputation and caliber takes a stab at presenting a coherent theory of mind in new dress and ambiance: Naive realism.

This isn't the first book of Searle's I'd recommend. That honor goes to "Mind, Language, and Society," his short, but densely argued, and clearer exposition, of several ideas (some of which he adumbrates from this volume). If you like what you read in THAT book, this book will further delight you.

What's so agreeable about Searle, if not his syntax, is his willingness to posit a coherent theory of mind in the traditional vein but in entirely new clothing. It's refreshing to see a modern philosopher actually doing philosophy, not critiquing the philosophy of others. Searle would probably have advanced his cause by having someone else tidy up his presentation, as this drawback reduces the splendor of the overall book.

Frames the large picture of the mind-body duality
The current philosophical debates about what is the mind and how can it translate intentions into body actions including language and action are summed up into a convincing, clear-headed, yet arrogant and extremely mis-guided approach to this philosophical question. Searle's logical formalism may"pull-the-wool" over many people's eyes, but his statements have garnered much negative criticism in the eyes of his peers.

Perhaps the best way to sum up his book is that he believes there is no difference between the mind and the body, and that the original question is flawed, yet at the same time, he establishes the existence of an intention, an entirely mental concept have physical equivalences. This is really an uninspired type of answer, and is largely considered a cop-out by most. ... Read more

Product Description
This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind.In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind.In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of"mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Rey searches for the algorithm of mind.
Rey drops us into the middle of some contemporary debates in thephilosophy of mind. He often focuses on the attempts of other philosophersof mind to be 'eliminativists' or 'instrumentalists' with respect to themental states (states like beliefs and desires) that we are subjectivelyaware of by way of introspection. Rey suggests that people like Dennett arewrong to view "beliefs" as only being useful instruments by whichFolk Psychology allows us to predict future human behaviors. Rey thinkspeople like Paul Churchland are wrong to try to eliminate"beliefs" from the Science of Mind by replacing them with neuralnetwork processes.

What Rey offers is a spirited defense of 'mentalrealism', taking mental states like "beliefs" as the basis for analgorithmic description of how human minds work. Rey builds on Fodor'srepresentational theory of mind to produce his own version of aComputational/Representational Theory of Thought that tries to incorporateand extend our ordinary day-to-day world of mental experience: our beliefs,hopes, and desires.

Rey provides both an initial outline of his plan ofattack and a useful glossary of terms. Hequickly dances past "TheTemptations to Dualism"; anyone sympathetic to Chalmers or othermodern dualists will be disappointed with the brush-off dualism recieves.Rey's chief concern is fighting the forces of Eliminativism and issuingendless complaints about the weaknesses of trainable neural networks.Halfway through the book Rey finally makes clear that he is proposing atheory of thought that will have to be built upon some foundation (such asneural networks), but he is uninterested in developing such afoundation.

Rey wants to describe an algorithm by which sensoryexperiences (inputs) can be translated into abstract mental representations(elements of a Language of Thought) which can then be subjected tocomputational processes and so produce new representations and humanbehaviors (outputs). His formal system for doing this is the type of toyalgorithm that one commonly finds being offered in Freshman term papers bystudents who are getting their first exposure to artificical intelligenceor cognitive science. This is where most "realists" admit thatsomething must be done about the problem of getting semantics intosyntactical algorithms. Rey does not take up this challenge. Finally, Reysuggests how "Further Capacities" such as subjective quales mightbe incorporated into his theory.

Rey provides a clear statement of modernfunctionalism. Maybe Rey's level-headed methods will allow materialists togrant Rey's algorithmic approach to mind a place in the Science of Mind. Inthis age of mindless connectionistic models, we could sure use a viablecounter-balance at the high end of the brain/mind hierarchy. Only time willtell us if Rey's theory is viable or D.O.A. ... Read more

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Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject. ... Read more

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Jaegwon Kim presents a selection of his essays from the last two decades. The volume includes three new essays, on an agent-centered first-person account of action explanation, the concepts of realization and their bearings on the mind-body problem, and the nonexistence of laws in the special sciences. Among other topics covered are emergence and emergentism, the nature of explanation and of theories of explanation, reduction and reductive explanation, mental causation and explanatory exclusion. Kim tackles questions such as: How should we understand the concept of "emergence", and what are the prospects of emergentism as a doctrine about the status of minds? What does an agent-centered, first-person account of explanation of human actions look like? Why aren't there strict laws in the special sciences - sciences like biology, psychology, and sociology? The essays will be accessible to attentive readers without an extensive philosophical background. ... Read more

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Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today.

• Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind
  
• Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates
  
• A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored
  
• Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental content, and the nature of consciousness

Product Description
The Character of Mind provides a sweeping and accessible general introduction to the philosophy of mind.Colin McGinn covers all of the main topics--the mind-body problem, the nature of acquaintance, the relation between thought and language, agency, and the self.In particular, McGinn addresses the issue of consciousness, and the difficulty of combining the two very different perspectives on the mind that arise from introspection and from the observation of other people. This second edition has been updated with three new cutting-edge chapters on consciousness, content, and cognitive science to make it the reader of choice on this vital topic. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Most useful
This book makes some often difficult language, and topics, approachable for those willing to learn it.

Excellent and Comprehensive
This is a simple (though not simpleminded) introduction to the philosophy of mind (includes such topics as "consciousness", "self", "mental phenomena", etc).McGinn writeseloquently and uses interesting metaphors (eg, refers to the brain as"that greyish dumpling").It is highly recommended to theinterested person who wants a comprehensive overview of this lively area ofcontemporary philosophy. ... Read more

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Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science, that is, the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint products of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses primarily on the hypothesis of extended cognition, which asserts that human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. Rupert argues that the only plausible way in which to demarcate cognitions is systems-based: cognitive states or processes are the states of the integrated set of mechanisms and capacities that contribute causally and distinctively to the production of cognitive phenomena--for example, language-use, memory, decision-making, theory construction, and, more importantly, the associated forms of behavior. Rupert argues that this integrated system is most likely to appear within the boundaries of the human organism. He argues that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not, and that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong.

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind also examines further aspects of the situated program in cognitive science, including the embedded and embodied approaches to cognition. Rupert asks to what extent the plausible incarnations of these situated views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science. Here, Rupert focuses on the notions of representation and computation, arguing that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute the radical shifts in perspective they are often claimed to be. Rupert also argues that, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science.

"Rupert's book is a good read. It is a sustained, systematic, critical examination of the idea that minds are not simply ensconced inside heads, but extend into both bodies and the world beyond the body.... There is much to admire in this book. It is well-structured and well-written, adopting a self-consciously naturalistic perspective on how to understand the mind -- through our best, even if imperfect, empirical sciences in the domain of cognition. By presenting and critiquing a number of explicit arguments for and against the specific views that Rupert considers, Cognitive Systems advances the field."-- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Rupert's treatment is a state of the art sustained attack on various forms of the 'extended mind hypothesis'. It is rigorous and challenging, and will be of interest to a quite a large audience of researchers (graduates and above) in philosophy and in cognitive science. Rupert studiously avoids the 'straw men' that populate some recent critiques, and raises deep and sympathetic challenges that go to the core of the program."
--Andy Clark, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh ... Read more

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Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction is a lively and accessible introduction to one of philosophy's most active and important areas of research. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Decent Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
I picked up a copy of George Graham's introductory book upon a friend's recommendation. I have a little background in Philosophy and a degree in Cognitive Science, so I figured this would be an appropriate immersion into Philosophy of Mind. With the exception of a few witty jokes, this book is lacking of any new or clever ideas whatsoever, and does only a fair job explaining the rest.

This book fumbles through topics, offering explainations and strange analogies when they are not needed, and glazes over more difficult topics. In many cases a topic will be left ambiguous and unresolved, and another will begin.

It's a good book for a beginner without any background on Philosophy and "the Mind"-- but still room for improvment.

Living up to its name
George Graham, in this work, succeeds in remaining loyal to what a reader expects in an introductory book. With clarity and simplicity, Dr. Graham seeks to draw the reader into the inner sanctum of some of the complex issues debated by many of the greatest minds since Descarte. Addressing provocative questions like God's existence and life after death, topics comprising Philosophy of Mind are explicated. Sensitive to the reader's presumed level of understanding , Graham eschews confusing language, and the quagmire some authors unwittingly conduct their audience. Yet, for the non-beginner, further research is available through helpful bibliographies at the end of each section. Footnote explanations are also provided for those desiring more detail. For students uncomfortable purchasing books with 'Dummies' in the title, this work will reward its reader with a taste of Philosophy of Mind and perhaps an answer to the question whether further research in the field is warranted. It's a good start ... Read more

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Hinduism is the oldest surviving religion in the world. The religious and philosophical literature of Hinduism is vast, diverse and covers thousands of years of accumulated spiritual experiences of Hindu Saints and Seers. This book presents the fundamentals of Hindu religious and philosophical thought in a logical and straightforward manner. The purpose being, to create a story book for further study of Hinduism. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Also great for non-Hindus
A few years ago I went to my favorite metaphysical bookstore in Cambridge, MA, and asked them to recommend a good book for learning about Hinduism. They pointed me to The Hindu Mind. I've read many books on spiritual philosophy from different traditions and I can say this ranks right up there as one of my favorites.Mr. Pandit explains the many facets of Hinduism with intelligence and clarity.His straightforward writing style is easy to read and understand. The book is organized well also. He presents Hinduism from 3 perspectives: the philosophical, religious and cultural.

Mr. Pandit also includes a couple of chapters with philosophical perspectives on Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism as all 3 are offshoots from Hindism. He points out which aspects of Hindusim they kept and where their beliefs differ.

One of the things I love about Hinduism is how intelligent it is.Of all the religions I've studied it's one of my favorites. (Note: I'm a neopagan mystic.) The ancients recognized that people are different and that different temperaments are attracted to different spiritual philosophies.Hinduism is the ultimate melting pot religion, and is capable of containing the complexity of multiple spiritual belief systems unified by a few key threads.I'm sure that's why it's survived all these thousands of years.

No matter what your religious background, if you are an openminded person you wil learn much from this book that can be applied to your own path, whatever that may be.

This is the best book for Hindu-Americans !
This is the best book for Hindu-Americans who want to know every aspect of Hindu society, culture, and heritage.It is the only book written in Engligh that Hindu-Americans can understand and in a style they can relate to.I bought this at a Hindu Students Council (HSC)program and I know there are many people who have liked it as much as me.Look for his new book Hindu Dharma also

Extremely informative, easy-to-read, and enlightening.
I found this book to be very well organized and indexed, making it easy to use as a reference guide.The book not only provides a solid foundation of all aspects of Hinduism, it illustrates the practical nature of these beliefs.Ancient Sanskrit verses that are still commonly used by Hindus today are translated while retaining there original charm.I also found that the book does a good job in clearing the common misperceptions of this religion and distinguishes between the actual religion and philosophy versus ascribed meanings by sources outside of Hinduism.I would recommend this book to anyone, particularly those that are intrigued by this religion but don't want to be overwhelmed.If nothing else, the index, charts, tables, and illustrations will provide a wealth of information ... Read more

Product Description
This seminal contribution to Kant studies, originally published in 1982, was the first to present a thorough survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. Ameriks focuses on Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, and examines how the themes raised there are treated in the rest of Kant's writings. Ameriks demonstrates that Kant developed a theory of mind that is much more rationalistic and defensible than most interpreters have allowed. ... Read more

Product Description
When historian Charles Weiner found pages of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman's notes, he saw it as a "record" of Feynman's work. Feynman himself, however, insisted that the notes were not a record but the work itself.In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that our thinking doesn't happen only in our heads but that "certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world." The pen and paper of Feynman's thought are just such feedback loops, physical machinery that shape the flow of thought and enlarge the boundaries of mind. Drawing upon recent work in psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, robotics, human-computer systems, and beyond, Supersizing the Mind offers both a tour of the emerging cognitive landscape and a sustained argument in favor of a conception of mind that is extended rather than "brain-bound." The importance of this new perspective is profound. If our minds themselves can include aspects of our social and physical environments, then the kinds of social and physical environments we create can reconfigure our minds and our capacity for thought and reason. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Significant Defense of the Extended Mind
One of the tricks in philosophy is to take a vague concept and pump the hell out of it.The mind is one of those dangerously vague folk psychology concepts along with self, consciousness, awareness, and most of the buzz words in Cognitive Science.So what one seeks to do is to whittle down the concept to get the bark off and find the essential core.Then and only then does it seem legitimate for one to work on what it would mean to extend it, whatever "it" is. But how long do we have to wait for the 'reductionist' Churchlands to whittle things down and solve that riddle?

Andy Clark has, by the accident of our history, been handed a hot potato in that mind is one of those "it"s that no one knows really what it is.So it is essential that we move to the biological neurological explanation of what "it" is as best we can.That is not what Andy is doing here, and he knows it.But what's the man to do?The problem is that mind appears to be a supervened phenomena which you are not likely to find in some lobe in the brain.Given that, what Andy has done is to work with what we know about the mind so far and he does tap into a lot of empirican studies that have been completed over several decades.

And he also knows when to stop.For example, he mentions extension of the mind into society, a social sense of the extended mind, but leaves that topic for a later book.Just as well as Alvin Goldman and Frederique de Vignemont are already guarding the gates to that temple with their rejection of the Embodiment of Mind in Society.It will take some interesting new arguments, perhaps from an evolutionary anthropological point of view (Sarah Blaffer Hrdy?) to find a way in.

They are not alone.Adam and Aizawa, Ned Block with his emphasis on qualia, and Robert Rupert are presenting strong objections that have to be addressed.Clark does address Adams and Aizawa in chapter five and in chapter six some of Rupert's arguments are argued against.But Rupert just published a new book (which you can also buy through Amazon) that may have some new arguments or even rebutals to Clark's refutations. (I haven't had a chance to read Rupert's new book so cannot comment on it here.)

I must admit my bias.I love Clark's book.I've read it several times and get new ideas each time I read it.And isn't that what philosophy is all about, building up the framework to get to the next level?

Read this book!Amazon has a great price and you won't regret it.Pay attention to chapter one, it seems to be about robots, but it is just the beginning of an argument for melting our ideas about what has to be embedded in the head.Andy admits to the essential neurological core of what happens in the brain.No brain, no mind.He just wants us to realize that there is more to the mind that what happens in the brain.By the time you get past chapter seven you will realize that is a no brainer.Then, just to settle you down, Andy puts on the brakes in the last three chapters and draws what he feels are the limits to extension.

So why is this all so very important?Because humans are about to launch off into a world that merges the brain with the external world that, coupled with genetic engineering, will forever change what it means to be a human.Just having the Internet has probably raised the average virtual IQ of teens by at least 10 points, if they can get over the game phase. (Clark doesn't consider the Internet a part of the Extended Mind, but I do.)Don't worry, it is not the scary story that Dr. Bill Joy fears.It is humanity that metaphorizes, not unlike a butterfly, or locust, your choice.But you need a manuel.Here is the beginning of that manuel.

A Relevant lecture
It is general and deep in contents at the same time. Very interesting even for the specialist in this matter

good overview of where things stand right now, emphasizing "right now"
Andy Clark's unfortunately-titled Supersizing the Mind sounds at first like some sort of awful self-help book, like one of those "play Bach for baby in the womb" treatises.

But of course it is nothing like that. It is the latest of the prolific Clark's manifestos in support of what is more generally known as the Situated Cognition Movement [cf. The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition], of which he is a founder. It is expansive and well-written.

Without wading into the detail (which, n.b., you will have to do if you read the book) this movement looks at the mind in the context of not only the brain but also the body and the environment in which the body wanders. It presents a strong contrast to computational models of the mind that are mostly about abstract representations and algorithms, i.e., Turing Machine implementations of intelligence.

I am sympathetic to Clark's approach and so did not read Supersizing the Mind as critically as I might have. If you are interested in understanding where some of the key arguments in modern cognitive science reside, I can recommend this book wholeheartedly. Clark does a clear and fair job of explaining both himself and his critics.

But it is important to remember that Supersizing the Mind represents a point in time. In five years the field will have moved on in terms of research and challenges to both old and new approaches to understanding intelligence. So get it while you can; otherwise wait for Clark's next.

Extend Your Mind: Everything You Ever Wanted To Know
One of the common failings of philosophy books is they try to do too much. Often the urge to prove everything is driven by the need to prove one's self, a justification of one's current philosophical position, sometimes of a whole career. "Supersizing the Mind" is not only an exception, it is an exceptional achievement in the breadth and depth of its scholarship and the concise quality of its exposition. Clark successfully makes the case for the Extended Mind -- and defends it equally well against its critics. He achieves this in little more than two hundred pages. A writer with less ability and more ego might have imposed (literally) the gravitas of a thousand pages to parade the extent of his erudition. If I have any criticism, it's that Clark writes too well to bury his insights beneath a mountain of references. The book contains so many enjoyable sentences, I wish he would produce another work filled with more of these and fewer endnotes. I suspect there is an audience for such a non-academic paper; perhaps a long Wired article. It would advance the popular case for the Extended Mind. Meanwhile, read "Supersizing the Mind." The quality of Clark's writing alone makes it worthwhile. ... Read more

Product Description
Since the dawn of history philosophers have speculated about the nature of mind.What kind of thing is the mind?How do mental processes fit with the rest of the natural order?Is the mind something different and separate from the body?What is distinctive of the various kinds of mental phenomena such as thinking, feeling, sensing, and consciousness?Addressing these and related problems, this anthology provides a framework for understanding mental functioning. The readings are grouped into five major sections: General Problems about Mind, Self and Other, Mind and Body, The Nature of Mind, and Psychological Explanation.Each section begins with an introduction that discusses the issues and problems that arise in the various selections and shows how each author approaches them.In addition, a general introduction gives a concise overview of the subject and provides a historical context for the readings. Representative works of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Descartes, Locke, and Reid provide a solid foundation for the copious selections from contemporary philosophers that follow, among them articles by Fodor, Dennett, Nagel, Putnam, Davidson, Searle, Ryle, Strawson, Burge, Chisholm, Rorty, and Sellars.With sixty-two selections in all, The Nature of Mind is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in this central philosophical topic. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Highly interesting, but TINY print!
I'm taking a course right now called Philosophy of Mind, and this is one of our textbooks. The topic is fascinating to me, has been for years, in fact is something I have been discussing for years with my philosophy-professor-brother-in-law.

But gosh, did they have to use such a teeny tiny typeface? It's giving me a headache! And when they have a quoted passage within an article, THAT is even TINIER! Oh my! Please pass the Excedrin!

Okay, given that it's a somewhat sizable book, and HEAVY for its size, and using a larger font would make the book larger - okay, so make the book larger! It could stand to grow a bit! The too-small print is costing you 2 stars! Seriously! I really do have a headache, and it's not from the topic!

Very good collection
This collection of articles is one of the best available in phil. of mind. Its range and completeness is amazing, starting from selections of Descartes, Locke and Reid up to papers on eliminative materialism andmachine functionalism. I'd definitely recommend this for anybody willing toget serious about the subject. If you haven't already studied the paperscontained here, do it, for they 're absolutely fundamental to our currentunderstanding of the problems in the phil. of mind. ... Read more

Product Description
In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory—which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name)—and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems.

Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST). ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

a good read
You'll find this one hard to put down. Rockwell writes very well: his self-confidence is invigorating without being excessive, and his use of friendly sarcasm toward many of the big names in philosophy of mind gives the reader a vivid point of entry into the chief problems of the field (I now feel a lot smarter about all the disputes Rockwell covers than I did before reading his book, which took less than 24 hours amidst numerous other activities).

The book makes two major claims, and I find the first a lot more interesting than the second (hence 4 stars rather than 5):

1. Mentality is not linked only with the brain. Numerous events that go on in the nervous system and hormonally have to count as mental. Pushing things still further, Rockwell argues that since mentality involves interactions with the environment, we cannot really restrict the mental realm to an "inner" sphere of the human body. This is all quite fascinating.

2. Rockwell justifies his theory on the basis of the pragmatist metaphysics of Dewey. This initially serves as a refreshing basis for his relational theory of the mind, but it eventually leads him into deeper waters where he merely asserts the more extreme metaphysical consequences of pragmatism... nothing has intrinsic qualities, it's unclear whether the world can exist without humans, etc. Granted, this was not explicitly meant as a work on metaphysics, but the antirealist underpinnings of his relational theory of mind come off as a bit facile.

Nonetheless, the book is a pleasure to read.

Pushing the envelope clearly
Concise, clear tour of the field of mind, brain, language studies - pushing the envelope back to Dewey and then ahead with the dynamic systems theorists & connectionists. Exemplary. He is at the forefront of philosophers working to understand the continuities of mind and environment. ... Read more