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Customer Reviews (5)

This historical event written in easy to read langauage.
I enjoyed this book immensely. I found it to be logical in explaining the cold war era, as it also incorporated the effect it had on the Middle East.It was a great eye-opener showing the US and Soviet Unions struggle to gain dominance and power over the Middle East. I was actually thinking after I had read it `what would have been different if the US had not won the cold war with the Soviet Unions demise'?
A very good read! Left me thinking!

Fail
I am always interested in critical reviews of this subject. But I could not read very far into this book because of its initial premise, that the Cold War was like a division championship playoff between the Red Sox and the Yankees - people of good will could prefer either the Red Sox or the Yankees, it was just a playoff game with no moral principle at stake.

That is just wrong.

I don't see how any knowledgeable person could regard the Cold War as a simple contest between two morally equivalent "superpowers".

One of them - my side - made plenty of mistakes, as is common in human institutions.

The other side was consistently motivated by evil.Its mistakes were tactical, whereas those of my side were sometimes tactical, and sometimes involved a moral lapse.The latter failure was never present on the other side, since it never was governed by morality.

Perhaps there are some useful messages in this book.I probably won't ever find them.For me the book is unreadable - it is like a history of WW II that starts by stating that the Nazis and the Allies were just two contenders in a sporting match.

The Middle East in the Cold War
The Middle East has been in the news since the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11, the United States went into these countries trying to stop further terrorist attacks against the United States.Rashid Khalidi examines the role that the United States and the USSR played in the Middle East, and the affects that their meddling has had on the Middle East after the Cold War was over.Rashid Khalidi argues that the United States was the more dominant power in the Middle East than the USSR, and that both the USSR and the United States played a game of real politik, with supporting certain regimes even if they were not democratic; as long as you were not with the Soviets, and this grand political game has had an affect on these countries many years after the end of the Cold War.

This is a well written, and argued book.Mr. Khalidi examines documents that have been recently unclassified by both sides of the Cold War, to show that the Soviets and the Americans were willing to work with any group that suited their interests, and even betray groups after their usefulness was over.From playing both sides of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, to supporting the creation of Israel.Both sides wanted to get rid of the influence of the former colonizers, the British and the French, and become the dominant powers.Mr. Khalidi writes a scholarly work, but it does not feel like one.It is well written, and the evidence supports his thesis.This is for students of Cold War and modern Middle Eastern history.

Reviewed by
Kevin Winter

A Revealing History
This scholarly work by Prof. Khalidi offers a highly readable history of the Middle East by delving into the numerous historical events that shaped the current situation, presenting these events from the perspectives of the different protagonists and analysing their motives. The imperial aspirations of the big powers from the 19th century, their Cold War and post-Cold War rivalry, provide the background to their continuing influence in this region through their support for venal elites who run some of their client states. The imperial embrace of weak nations under various pretexts such as stability and democracy is often a kiss of death in the longer term. While countries in many other regions have been able to partially extricate themselves from big power politics, the Middle East remains an area big powers still control through client states governed mostly by the undemocratic rulers who rely on external support for their continuation in power. Western readers whose knowledge of the region is based on sanitised versions of world events by "TV experts" and political spin doctors will find this book disturbing.

Important but doesn't give Arabs enough agency
This is an important book from the well known scholar Rashid Khalidi whose previosu writings have usually focused on the Arab-Israei conflict.(The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood).However he has, of late, expanded his interests to examine the entire Middle East and particularly the 'western' influence and meddling in the region.

In this work he seeks to examine the role of the Cold War in the Middle East.For a long time scholars have spoken of what is called an 'Arab Cold War', the internal struggle between Arab regimes who were allied with the U.S and Russia.Egypt was a lynchpin in this for the Egyptian Nationalist government of Nasser and Sadat flirted with he Soviets for some twenty years.Nasserism also influenced revolutions in Yemen and attempted coups in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as Baghdad.Syria under the Ba'ath and the Asad family was a close ally of the Soviets.So was Iraq under the Ba'ath. On the other side were the Saudis, the Gulf States, Egypt after 1980, Jordan's King Hussein, the Yemenite royalists, Baghdad before 1968 and Turkey.Lebanon was always problematic, torn by chaos after 1976 it had numerous influences.The Palestinians too curried favor with the Soviets, especially the PFLP and George Habash.

Islamism and its rise among the Brotherhood,Hamas, and particularly in Iran in 1979 placed a third counterbalance to this Cold War reivalry in the region.Herein lies the problem with the Khalidi analysis.Khalidi wants to show that the U.S and Soviet Union 'sowed crises' in the Middle East.This follows in the footsteps of the older idea that the carving up of the region in 1918 by Europeans also 'sowed' the problems of today.But both of these views neglect Arab agency.What of Mumar Qadafi of Libya, Nasser and the Saudis?What of the Shah and the Ayatollah.All of these men used the West and operated within the contexts they needed to and each in their own way also stood up to the West.This is not to mention Saddam Hussein whose 1991 Gulf War actually pitted him against the U.S and the Russians along with others.

Ibn Saud and the rise of Saudi predates both the 1918 carving up of the Ottoman empire and the Cold War.Hardly a tool of U.S policy the Saudis have worked with the U.S and extended their influence.The revolutionary regimes, such as Nasser, also played the West, sometimes using Western money to build the Aswan Dam and inviting Soviet advisors to help them fight the Israelis.Israel too, now seen as a close aly of the U.S, once coveted close relations with the Soviets.

To ascribe all that has happaned in the Middle East to 'the west' and blame it on the Cold War ignored the agency of the Arab, Persian, Turkish, Jewish and other peoples in the region.Far from always being puppets they had great agecny, their own reolutions and movements and they choose when and where to fight their wars, wars that forced the West into the region in many cases.The U.S in fact long ignored the Middle East between 1948 and 1956 until the Suez crises for Ike to take the side of Egypt against the UK, hardly an example of Cold War 'sowing crises'.

This book is important but places too much emphasis on the importance of the West and fails to see the important role that local rulers played in decision making.While the fad is to blame others for the problems of the Middle East this book doesn't give local people credit where credit is due for their innovations and political experiments.

Seth J. Frantzman



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Examining key events of the 20th century, each title in this series outlines the lead-up and aftermath, explores the issues, and introduces leaders and key figures. Titles of useful websites and further reading recommendations are given. ... Read more

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Could be more even-handed
This book gives a good, coherent overview of the Cold War from the American viewpoint. British and Soviet views of the events were scarcely mentioned, and the book appears slightly biased compared to Ben Walsh's GCSE Modern World History textbook. Text, layout & pictures are clear and attractive.My IGCSE History students will use this book for review and practice in analyzing viewpoint and bias in historical sources. ... Read more

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The 1940s was probably the most dramatic and decisive decade of the 20th century. This volume explores the Second World War and the origins of the Cold War from the vantage point of two of the great powers of that era, Britain and the USA, and of their wartime leaders, Churchill and Roosevelt. It also looks at their chequered relations with Stalin and at how the Grand Alliance crumbled into an undesired Cold War. But this is not simply a story of top-level diplomacy. David Reynolds explores the social and cultural implications of the wartime Anglo-American alliance, particularly the impact of nearly three million GIs on British life, and reflects more generally on the importance of cultural issues in the study of international history.This book persistently challenges popular stereotypes - for instance on Churchill in 1940 or his Iron Curtain speech. It probes cliches such as 'the special relationship' and even 'the Second World War'. And it offers new views of the familiar, such as the Fall of France in 1940 or Franklin Roosevelt as 'the wheelchair president'.Incisive and readable, written by a leading international historian, these essays encourage us to rethink our understanding of this momentous period in world history. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

GREAT INSIGHTS.
david reynolds clear and deep thinking aboutchurchill roosevelt and anglo american relations is unique here. ... Read more

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The 1930s to the 1950s in Italy witnessed large increases in film-going, radio-listening, and the sale of music and weekly magazines. The industries that made and sold commercial, cultural products were transformed by the new technologies of reproduction and new approaches to marketing and distribution.

Yet historians tend to place the "real" genesis of mass culture in the 1960s, or to generalize about the harnessing of mass culture to the Fascist political project, without considering what kind of mass culture existed at the time and whether this harnessing was successful. This book draws on extensive new evidence, including oral histories and archival material, to explore possible continuities between the uses of mass culture before and after World War II.

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At a moment when American film reflects a deepening preoccupation with the Bush administration's War on Terror, this authoritative and timely book offers the first comprehensive account of Hollywood's propaganda role during the defining ideological conflict of the twentieth century: the Cold War. In an analysis of films dating from America's first Red Scare in the wake of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Tony Shaw examines the complex relationship between filmmakers, censors, politicians, and government propagandists.

Movies, Shaw demonstrates, were at the center of the Cold War's battle for hearts and minds. Hollywood's comedies, love stories, musicals, thrillers, documentaries, and science fiction shockers played a critical dual role: on the one hand teaching millions of Americans why communism represented the greatest threat their country had ever faced, and on the other selling America's liberal-capitalist ideas around the globe.

Drawing on declassified government documents, studio archives, and filmmakers' private papers, Shaw reveals the different ways in which cinematic propaganda was produced, disseminated, and received by audiences during the Cold War. In the process, he addresses subjects as diverse as women's fashions, McCarthyism, drug smuggling, Christianity, and American cultural diplomacy in India. Anyone seeking to understand wartime propaganda today will find striking contemporary resonance in his conclusions about Hollywood's versatility and power. ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (7)

And helpless governors wake To resume their compulsory game:
Professor Leffler explodes the myths of how America defeated the Soviet Union in the cold war.It is always good to be reminded of how political actors get pushed by the forces compelling them forward or are blinded by their own presuppositions.While Truman and Stalin, and Khrushchev and Kennedy were able to stumble through to a realpolitik their successors saw things less clearly, could less resist their own reactionaries or were overwhelmed by events they could not control.Leffler portrays the Cold War as a sequence of swings from a kind of tested balance following World War II to the nadir of American influence in the seventies as the third world liberated itself invoking socialist rhetoric and the Soviets profited from high oil prices to the '80s when entrepreneurship spread in Asia, third world countries floundered, and the Soviet Union's economy weakened.What is interesting in books about the cold war is that the American military juggernaut does not stop.The US constantly overrates Soviet ability because it suits so many interests to do so and thereby fails engage in the real kinds of disarmament the Soviets offer.
Leffler's book offers us heroes and villains.Among the latter Brzezinski stands out.Although Carter's could not see real national interest through the veil of his unrealistic commitment to human rights, nonetheless his secretary of state undermined what could have been an even greater additions to détente.Of course he was abetted by such Democratic hawks as the Senator from Boeing.The great hero is Gorbachev.Although Reagan because of his unquestioned conservative principles made a good co-conversant for Gorbachev, Leffler, as others, puts to bed the lie that Reagan's military spending brought the Soviet's to their knees and destroyed the "evil empire." Gorbachev knew that the Soviets didn't have to match the US in order to survive: their strike ability was just too great.They could not be bullied.Gorbachev, as almost all of the post Stalin leaders, knew that the Soviet union had to get its economic house in order and that the military drained that.He had the mistaken hope that this could be achieved retaining a socialist dream.Although not explored by Leffler, the Soviet command economy had too many flaws, so when loosed it produced mafia like mechanisms to keep production going.And worse, unlike China, the Soviet Union was rife with ethnic conflicts dating back way before the Revolution and exacerbated by Stalinist repression.These broke out in uncontrollable ways so that even if Gorby wanted to unleash, "it is good to be rich," while maintaining political control as in China, he couldn't.No question, Gorbachev is the greatest hero of the 20th century.Reagan was his accomplice but he could have pulled it off without Reagan.The sad part is that the transition might have been much earlier and maybe smoother if political and economic forces within the US hadn't profited from theCold War.As Leffler pointed out in the Reagan/Gorbachev negotiations the US got their way 85% of the time.With Bush the lesser and Co. we are seeing the fruits of that imbalance in the harm the US has done in the Middle East and the erosion of US dominance which bodes so strongly in the future as it now appears.
Charlie Fisher author of Dismantling Discontent: Buddha's Way Through Darwin's World

Even handed treatment of the Cold War
Melvyn has written a completely readable history of the Cold War.Very even handed in his treatment of all presidents beginning with Truman and ending with George Bush Sr.It is easy today to look back on this era and think that it was a waste of a great amount of resources.In a way it was, however it's important to never forget the sole ambition of the USSR was world domination; Marx, Lenin and the dialectic predicted this, or so they thought.The Soviets worked very hard to bring it about.In the end, capitalism won, as it will always win.

Very Good
This very good book is a largely successful effort to produce a portrait of the Cold War that is both accurate and accessible to a broad audience.Leffler accomplishes his objective by some smart decisions in limiting the content of the book. He focuses primarily on US-Soviet relations; he limits his discussion largely to the highest levels of diplomacy, particularly the decisions of our Presidents and the Soviet leadership at key moments; and he picks out five key sequences of the Cold War.The five key sequences are the initiation of the Cold War under Truman/Stalin, the end of the Cold War under Gorbachev/Reagan, and 3 periods when there were unsuccessful efforts to end/moderate the Cold War; Malenkov/Eisenhower after the death of Stalin, Kennedy-Johnson/Khruschev after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brezhnev/Carter and the end of detente.The latter three are discussed as examples of how hard it was to escape the dynamic of the Cold War and explorations of the forces that sustained the Cold War.

The title of the book reflects Leffler's conclusion about perhaps the most important element of initiating and sustaining the Cold War - ideology.Leffler argues well that the competing ideologies of liberal capitalism and communism really drove the way the leaderships of the USA and the Soviet Union perceived each other and influenced decisions.Leffler also shows how important the experience of WWII was, particularly the trauma of invasion, for the Soviets.Well into the 1970s, the fear of being confronted by a hostile, aggressive, powerful German (and encircled by a powerful Japanese state) was a major concern of the Soviet leadership.In a good example of how Soviet concerns were often mirrored in the USA, worries about German democratization were a feature of American policy making into at least the 1960s.Leffler sees the Cold War as inevitable.Both the USA and the Soviets required a pacified Europe and Japan to attain security but their conflicting visions of what such security would require resulted in inevitable conflict.While Leffler uses relatively neutral language in describing this fact, it has to be said that the American vision of a democratic alliance was and is considerably more noble than what Stalin had in mind.Leffler is careful to point out that Stalin was initially pragmatic and interested in some form of accomodation.

Once initiated, the Cold War proved remarkably difficult to moderate or end.The next 3 episodes discussed by Leffler all show how ideology, the mutual fears inherent in this type of strategic rivalry, entrenched special interests such as interservice rivalries and a powerful defense establishment in the Soviet Union, and the powerful domestic political forces set in train by the Cold War all contributed to sustaining the Cold War.Leffler is generally even handed in dealing with the major actors.All the principal actors, American presidents and major Soviet leaders after Stalin, are shown to have been concerned with the dangers of the nuclear rivalry and concerned with reducing the risk of mutual annihiliation.Some of the portraits are a bit surprising.Leonid Brezhnev, usually presented only as the apostole of stagnation and a return to aspects of the Stalinist past, receives a relatively sympathetic analysis.Jimmy Carter is portrayed as a relatively resolute and unlucky individual who tried hard to make sensible decisions in the face of unfavorable public pressure.

Like a number of other historians, Leffler concludes that Gorbachev was really the key figure in the end of Cold War.While virtually all of the major Soviet leaders were concerned about the exhausting effect the Cold War was having on the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and his supporters were really the first to be willing to make radical departures in Soviet policy to break the deadlock.Its notable that while Gorbachev lived through WWII and the German occupation, he was a small child and his formative years coincided with the Khruschev era efforts to reform the Soviet state.Leffler's treatment of Reagan is particularly interesting.Leffler politely dismisses the conservative-Republican triumphalist version of Reagan bludgeoning the Soviet Union into submission.While he assigns Reagan a secondary role, he gives Reagan considerable credit for being able to recognize that real progress was possible and being able to overcome the barriers faced by prior Presidents.

While generally successful, Leffler's choices about the structure of the book have drawbacks.The concentration on the USA-Soviet relationship is probably unavoidable, but it obscures the important role of many others in important aspects of the Cold War.For example, the role of European statesmen in the formation of NATO or the role of Kim Il Sung in the genesis of the Korean war.A major feature of the Cold War was the remarkably destructive effects of US-Soviet rivalry in the developing world.There is little here about that feature.Leffler's concentration on the actions of the principal leaders of the USA and Soviet Union tend to obscure the role that domestic political factors, often with little relationship to international strategic realities, had in driving US and probably Soviet policy.Finally, a fair amount of Leffler's analysis emerges implicitly, rather than explicitly.That said, the summary section that concludes the book contains a well considered and concise assessment of American policy in the Cold War.

Fair discussion of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War
"For the Soul of Mankind", by Melvyn Leffler, is a major study of the Cold War's political diplomacy. As the name would lead one to think, the focus is strongly on the ideological aspects of the political decision-making, but Leffler is fairly pragmatic and pays plenty of attention to issues of military strength, strategic interventions, Third World movements, and so on. There is also a lot of concentration on the personal characteristics of the countries' respective leaders, which sometimes leads it deplorably into "Great Men" historiography.

A lot can be said against this book. Not just the above-mentioned excessively biographical approach, but for example it does not actually cover all of the Cold War; Leffler describes it as covering five pivotal "episodes" in it, but in practice this means it is an all-out political history of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War, but with the odd aspect of (relatively) excluding Nixon and Ford. It seems that if one is writing about every other postwar president and leader anyway, one could as well add those too. But that aside, there is the fact that Leffler talks a lot about the economies of the respective countries, but without ever describing these and their development in concrete details. He also pays no attention to cultural and social developments, giving the book a very narrow international relations focus. One would also have liked to read more about the role of European leaders, both East and West, in the diplomatic and ideological struggle, but perhaps that is too much to include in one book.

However, this book is nonetheless a clear advance over the Cold War and neo-Cold War style of history writing, as opposed to the likes of Gaddis. Although Leffler excessively demonizes and fulminates against Stalin in the beginning, he treats the Soviet leaders remarkably sanely and accurately for an American historian of the Cold War, at no point falling for "evil empire" style propaganda. He clearly and concisely discusses not just the restraints and problems the American Presidents were facing during negotiations, but also those of the Soviet leadership. Commendable is the way in which he acknowledges the role of important leaders that were not the head of government, like Molotov, Mikoyan, Gromyko, etc. His description of Khrushchov in particular is very good, and in my view quite correctly re-establishes his intelligence, competence, and advanced insight into the problems of the USSR. He has been much maligned because of Stalinists hating him and anti-Communists also hating him, but this is quite undeserved. Some might say that Leffler overestimates Brezhnev's competence perhaps, whom he seems to hold in relatively high regard, but he does not diminish his weaknesses.

Leffler is very well informed about the substance of the major negotiation rounds between the US and the USSR, as well as the main points of contention and the periods of major crisis in the Cold War. He dispells some still common myths yet again, such as the idea that Reagan and the SDI program 'defeated communism', that Stalin wanted to attack Western Europe, that the Soviet leadership had wanted to invade Afghanistan, and that the USSR at any time wanted nuclear war. Leffler is rightly critical of both sides, and brings important things to the fore that are often underestimated as aspects of the ideological struggle: the enormous impact of the WWII experience on the USSR, the role of religion in motivating US Presidents, the complicated relationships of Soviet leaders to Stalin even long after his death, and the way the reformist Soviet leaders like Khrushchov and Gorbachov often felt betrayed by American belligerence. That the US misunderstood the situation in the USSR as often as the USSR did in the US is clear from this work, as is the fact that both sides were equally willing to be aggressor and interventionist when they felt threatened. In the end, as Leffler points out, it was Gorbachov's visionary leadership that inadvertently ended the USSR, which is both a blessing and a curse for the future of socialism.

Outstanding hstorical perspective
This was one of those books that "pulled it all together."I lived thorough these times, this is my history.However, Leffler was able to tell the story so it had meaning and clarity.He did a great job of showing both sides of the story. ... Read more

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At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. government enlisted the aid of a select group of psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists to blueprint enemy behavior. Not only did these academics bring sophisticated concepts to what became a project of demonizing communist societies, but they influenced decision-making in the map rooms, prison camps, and battlefields of the Korean War and in Vietnam. With verve and insight, Ron Robin tells the intriguing story of the rise of behavioral scientists in government and how their potentially dangerous, "American" assumptions about human behavior would shape U.S. views of domestic disturbances and insurgencies in Third World countries for decades to come.

Based at government-funded think tanks, the experts devised provocative solutions for key Cold War dilemmas, including psychological warfare projects, negotiation strategies during the Korean armistice, and morale studies in the Vietnam era. Robin examines factors that shaped the scientists' thinking and explores their psycho-cultural and rational choice explanations for enemy behavior. He reveals how the academics' intolerance for complexity ultimately reduced the nation's adversaries to borderline psychotics, ignored revolutionary social shifts in post-World War II Asia, and promoted the notion of a maniacal threat facing the United States.

Putting the issue of scientific validity aside, Robin presents the first extensive analysis of the intellectual underpinnings of Cold War behavioral sciences in a book that will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the era and its legacy. ... Read more

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How the West won
More than an overview of the best university and think tank efforts to help American policy makers turn the Cold War into a propaganda battle that the West could win, THE MAKING OF THE COLD WAR ENEMY by Ron Robin (Princeton University Press, 2001) almost captures the perversity of the times in which World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam were not quite what everybody was expecting to happen next, but close enough to fit into the conceptual framework that explains how narcissism was the greatest enemy against which governments and the social planners on every side were sure to end up offending someone.Typical of the thinkers included, Thomas Schelling is given credit for maintaining a single idea."Whether analyzing the strategies of America's global adversaries, domestic economic developments, or social trends at home and abroad, Schelling identified monopoly--economic, political, or ideological--as the source of all evil."(p. 39).

Don Quixote does not appear in the index of this book.Karl Marx isn't there, either, or any philosopher who might be associated with the concept, "end of ideology," which is an entry in the index and is discussed at several places in the book.After World War II, the shift in psychological warfare was not much, because "the task of the efficient psychological warrior was to devise a mechanism for circumventing the repressive devices of modern civilization in general and military life in particular in order to tap into the individual's natural state of narcissism.The exploitation of socially subversive primal drives was the main, if not the only, task of efficient psychological warfare."(p. 96).I was surprised that a journal article by Edward Shils, "The End of Ideology?" in 1955 was "credited with coining the phrase `end of ideology,' " (p. 130) in those contexts where "political rhetoric was of little significance."(p. 130).

There is a single entry in the index for Henry Kissinger, due merely to a comment he made for a New York Times article on reactions to the book, REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN."A chagrined Herman Kahn dismissed the report as `very bad satire,' while Henry Kissinger diagnosed the author as `an idiot.' " (p. 229).The seven pages of the index do not fully reflect the number of times that some names appear in the book.I'm not actually sure if the name, Don Quixote, appears in the book, but I know that other names in the book have prompted me to check the index, only to wonder if the author, a Professor of History at Haifa University in Israel, has a habit of referring offhandedly to characters of books, television shows, or movies, as President Ronald Reagan frequently did, which are just as fictitious as Don Quixote.

One name in the index, Carl Pletsch, is of an author whom I have slighted far more than he ever slighted me, and in 1981 he wrote a journal article, "The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, circa 1950-1975" which is covered by this book."As historian Carl Pletsch has observed, modernization theorists approached the competing socialist bloc as a proto-modern development, encumbered temporarily by an ideology preventing its `efficient and natural' development.By contrast, the free world appeared to be at a higher evolutionary stage, `guided by invisible hands' and supposedly developing `without ideological prescription or management.'The assumption of `the more natural' developmental stage of capitalist democracies implied that the socialist world, once freed from the transitory encumbrance of ideological chains, would `slowly but surely approximate the free world.' "(pp. 32-33).

DON QUIXOTE is much longer than this book, but the form of suspense maintained by its author, Cervantes, in those episodes in which a great adventure was about to be told, but the narrative included so much detail that countless pages needed to be turned before the events of great renown could be fully disclosed, was frequently on my mind as I plowed through minor matters about behavioral science, opinion leaders, and political elites which became the epitome of perversity as long as Vietnam was an active issue in American politics or history.The tenth chapter was the goal of this quixotic quest, "Paradigm Lost:The Project Camelot Affair," on pages 206-225 would bring about "Extensive disenchantment with modernization as dominant theory and the demise of Project Camelot as exemplary praxis."(p. 224).The big excitement in the middle of the book is like a game theory applied to the negotiation of the armistice for the Korean War.

Key figures in the book include Harold Lasswell, who is mentioned far more frequently than merely for the six topics which cover the pages for his name in the index, Nathan Leites, whose listings include brainwashing, counter-insurgency, nuclear strategy, operational codes, and Vietcong psychological warfare, and Herbert Goldhamer, who is introduced on page 124 as a Rand Corporation author of Korean memoirs, who, "By late August 1951, he had assumed the unofficial position of coach and confidant at the armistice talks.His active participation in the negotiations during the fall of 1951 removed the stigma of irrelevance from Rand's social science division and thrust this hitherto marginal unit into the eye of the storm."(pp. 124-125).Warren Zevon once released a rock 'n' roll album called "The Envoy" in 1982, about 30 years after those negotiations, and this was my first opportunity to see if the intellectual involvement in the process was more exciting than the songs on that album.This book depends on the idea, "that communist elites were orthodox followers of a `secular religion.'As faithful followers they adhered rigidly to dogma"(p. 133) which was not quite as exciting as "Upon joining the team of armistice negotiators, Goldhamer distributed copies of THE OPERATIONAL CODE."(P. 134)." `Compromise' did not appear in the index."(p. 135)."They were communist clones of their Russian Bolshevik benefactors."(p. 135).There's one that America's rebels won't go on believing forever. ... Read more

Product Description
As America watched the fall of the Berlin Wall with great enthusiasm, President George H. W. Bush called the incident simply "a good development." He knew that the Cold War was far from over and that bringing it to an end would require not only symbolic gestures but also practical diplomacy.

During Bush's presidency (1989-93), the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Germany was reunified, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Yet, many people believe the Cold War ended under Reagan and that Bush's foreign policy achievements were merely an extension of Reagan's policies.

In this in-depth look at the Bush administration's handling of the end of the Cold War, author Christopher Maynard argues that Bush actually made a fundamental shift in foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union. In part, he believes, historians have downplayed Bush's contribution because they have focused on the strong ideological rhetoric of Reagan and Gorbachev without looking at the day-to-day process of policymaking during the Cold War.

Out of the Shadow incorporates a variety of important, previously unused sources. Its focused treatment of the topic will appeal to scholars interested in both the first Bush presidency and the Cold War. ... Read more

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This work is a contemporary chronicle of the Cold War and offers an analysis of policy and rhetoric of the United States and Soviet Union during the 1980s. The authors examine the assumptions that drove political decisions and the rhetoric that defined the relationship as the Soviet Union began to implode.

This work demonstrates that while the subsequent unraveling of the Soviet empire was an unintended side effect of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, termination of the Cold War was not. Ronald Reagan deserves full credit for recognizing Gorbachev's sincerity and his determination to change the direction of Soviet policies. For this, Reagan felt the full wrath of anticommunist hawks for doing business with a communist leader. But it was Gorbachev who concluded the superpowers had become mesmerized by ideological myths which ruled out any meaningful discussions of a possible accommodation of political issues for more than four decades. The evidence is compelling that Gorbachev himself broke the Cold War's ideological straight jacket that had paralyzed Moscow and Washington's ability to resolve their differences. Though politically weakened, Gorbachev conceded nothing to U.S. military superiority. Never did he negotiate from a position of weakness. In doing so, the last Soviet leader faced even greater political and physical risk. Without Gorbachev the end of the Cold War could have played out very differently and perhaps with great danger.

Customer Reviews (1)

Revisiting the End of the Cold War
Between them, Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns and Joseph M. Siracusa have published over two hundred scholarly books and articles on American history, foreign policy and diplomacy. Their latest volume, "Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War," is exactly what one would expect from three historians of this caliber. Anyone wishing to understand the end of the Cold War - which is itself critical to understanding contemporary American foreign policy and diplomacy - would do well to start with this book. ... Read more

Product Description
In September 1946, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Nikolai Novikov, sent a 19-page cable to Foreign Minister Molotov describing the likely direction of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period. Recently discovered in the Soviet archives, the Novikov telegram parallels the famous "Long Telegram" of U.S. diplomat George Kennan. Published here for the first time in English, Novikov's telegram is presented alongside Kennan's cable and a similar telegram by British diplomat Frank Roberts. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

The Limits of Diplomatic Reporting
This interesting but limited book reprints three diplomatic cables from 1946 that analyzed the collapse of the Anglo-American-Soviet alliance of World War II and the outbreak of the Cold War:George Kennan's famous "long telegram" from Moscow; a cable from Soviet Ambassador Novikov in Washington; and a cable sent by the British charge in Moscow.Unlike most diplomatic reports, these cables dealt with huge questions of policy and were read by top officials of the home governments.They underscore how differently London, Washington and Moscow saw the world.

The British analysis was the most nuanced and non-apocalyptic; it still instructs and reads well in 2007.In contrast, Kennan's report was surprisingly shallow, even though it had a big impact in Washington; it came close to reducing Soviet foreign policy to neurotic anxiety, as if Moscow had no legitimate interest in secure borders.The analysis sent by the Soviet embassy was a curious document, mixing paranoia about American military preparations with shrewd observations of global politics.None of the cables displayed a deep understanding of the inner workings of the host government.Each served mainly to reinforce inclinations already prevalent in foreign policy circles back home.

Connoisseurs of diplomatic reporting will enjoy this book, but there's little reason for others to bother with it.The short commentaries do not -- contrary to the title -- add up to a history of the origins of the Cold War, though they do serve as good examples of how historians analyze documents.For specialists only. ... Read more

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A Great Follow-Up to a Fun Series
Harry Blamires's series takes a critical look at the Christian Afterlife and attempts to brush away many of the fuzzy-headed assumptions about good and evil that we have let grow up over the years.This second novel in the series shows the main character visiting Hell along with his guardian angel.This time he attempts to show the self-defeating nature of the hell-blinded mind, which is not only caught in a cycle of sin but is incapable of seeing the way out without the grace of God.Mr. Blamirez writes cynicaly humorous stuff which lampoons the foolishness of the modern world. ... Read more

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The Cold War and the University is a groundbreaking collection of newly commissioned essays on the changes in intellectual life and the nature of the university in America during the Cold War era. In it, distinguished contributors show the many ways existing disciplines, such as political science and anthropology, were affected by the Cold War ethos; they discuss the rise of new fields, such as area studies; and they explore the changing nature of dissent and academic freedom during the Cold War. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (10)

We need a society based on human values, other than buying and selling (N. Wiener)
The most important events in the US during the Cold War were McCarthyism and the Vietnam War. But there were also other important issues, like research and field work funding or ideology.
As L. Nader rightly remarks, `repressive and fear generating events such as the cold war periodically appear, thereby facilitating industrial and military regulation of academic affairs.'
For N. Chomsky, the all important issue is `to reduce the threat of democracy and to establish more firmly the Madisonian principle on which the US was founded: that the prime responsibility of government is to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.'

McCarthyism
For, R. Lewontin, there was direct influence on academic affairs, because of `opportunism and cowardice of boards of trustees and university administrators.'
There was passive acceptance of firings, blacklistings, attacks on unions and harassment. (H. Zinn)
Ex-communists named names. Hundreds of teachers lost their job; many left the country; some committed suicide. (L. Nader)

Research and field work
Research became more and more `militarized': geophysics and oceanography (R. Siever), the social sciences (I. Wallerstein) or anthropology (L. Nader).
In the face of US anti-State ideology, the codeword for grants was `war': war on cancer, on diseases, on poverty or on drugs (R. Lewontin).
Fieldwork by anthropologists was used in counterinsurgency, for expulsion of people out of areas with oil reserves, for testing of atomic technology on small human populations, for monitoring political loyalty and for creating a climate of intellectual repression. (L. Nader).

Ideology
A general silence about the Cold War reigned among historians. But some went beyond silence by distorting the truth out of national loyalty. (H. Zinn)
In `English Literature', academics turned to timeless universals (love, death, art) and didn't cover such notions as `history, race, class conflict, empire, power or privilege.' (R. Ohmann)

This mixed collection of essays is a most valuable contribution to the history of the Cold War. It is a must read for all those interested in US history.

A very important compilation
Viewing a political era from a particular point of view, from a subjective perspective can often manage to shed light on much more.The experiences reported by the individuals in this book are extremely well written stories that transcend the bounds of what at first seems a narrow topic.Still, if you have a particular interest in education and the politics of universities and colleges, you will find this book even more intriguing.

A very important compilation
Viewing a political era from a particular point of view, from a subjective perspective can often manage to shed light on much more.The experiences reported by the individuals in this book are extremely well written stories that transcend the bounds of what at first seems a narrow topic.Still, if you have a particular interest in education and the politics of universities and colleges, you will find this book even more intriguing.

Useful, But Narrow
A book such as this is somewhat valuable, but I was disappointed by the narrowness of the people included. It's as if only Leftists in universities had any experience of the Cold War, and since we know this to be false, why not call this book "Leftist Academics and The Cold War University" or something? What about the old guys reading Latin texts in their offices who thought the world was going mad? What about old-fashioned Liberals who were profoundly ambivilent towards both the American Right and the Stalinist (and post-Stalinist)American Left? The editor was more interested, I suppose, in gathering lefty celebs with high name recognition than he was in getting a ground level view, and that mention of Studs Terkel in the above editorial comments made me yearn for some of Terkel's interest in the folks who are usually overlooked in the rush to sign up the people who've already had their say. Until a good oral history of that sort comes around, I guess this will have to do.

Marxist Zealots?
I find it very disturbing that people consider these professors as"Marxist Zealots". By your comment, A READER FROM THE USA, youdemonstrate who is really misleading the public. Noam Chomsky is NOT aMarxist, he is an Anarchist. Get your facts straight. And to say that thesepeople thought Pol Pot was a "great guy" only shows to whichdegree you are willing to fabricate lies in order to advance your ownpolitical bias. These people are against all forms of genocide andoppression, whether it be Stalin, Pol Pot or JFK and Richard Nixon. ... Read more

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In this novel and intriguing book, Michael Schaller traces the origins of the Cold War in Asia to the postwar occupation of Japan by U.S. troops.Determined to secure Japan as a bulwark against both Soviet expansion and Asian revolution, the U.S. instituted ambitious social and economic reforms under the direction of the flamboyant Occupation Commander, General Douglas MacArthur.MacArthur was later denounced by the Truman Administration as a "bunko artist" who had wrecked Japan's economy and opened it to Communist influence, and power was shifted to Japan's old elite.Cut off from its former trading partners, which were now all Communist-controlled, Japan, with U.S. backing, turned its attention to the rich but unstable Southeast Asian states.The stage was thus set for U.S. intervention in China, Korea, and Vietnam. ... Read more

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Been there, learned about that
As one who lived in Occupied Japan for several months, I've always wanted to know what was happening overall to influence our day-to-day lives.This book, by a respected historian, provides the flow of geopolitical events that helped explain that time of our family's life.Prof. Schaller also provides the documentation that shreds whatever naive respect I once had for Douglas MacArthur. More detail is available in a separate biography by the same author who has also written an account of the relations between Japan and the US beginning with the Korean War and the Peacy Treaty of 1952 and for the years afterward. ... Read more

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The new editions of Access to History combine all the strengths of this well-loved series with a new design and features that allow all students access to the content and study skills needed to achieve exam success. The Second Edition of this popular title has been revised to reflect the needs of the current specifications. The book starts by examining the crucial events of 1944-7, which led to the break down of the Second World War alliance between the 'Big Three' and the onset of the Cold War. It shows how the Cold War shaped post-war Europe through the creation of two great military and economic blocs. Key events such as the Berlin bockade of 1948-9, the Hungarian revolt of 1956, the second Berlin crisis of 1958-61 and collapse of Communism from 1989-91. Inthis new edition additional material on detente has been added. Throughout the book key dates, terms and issues are highlighted, and historical interpretations of key debates are outlined. Summary diagrams are included to consolidate knowledge and understanding of the period, and exam style questions and tips for each examination board provide the opportunity to develop exam skills. ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (9)

It's about time
It's about time that someone has written an objective book about what Stalin accomplished.Robert's book is excellent, provides a long overdue reassessment of Stalin's role in World War II.If it hadn't been for the Soviet Union's resilience in face of the Nazionslaught, western civilization would have been finished off by Hitler.If it hadn't been for Stalin going along with Roosevelt's ideas about the postwar world, we wouldn't have the United Nations.

The Wars of a Dictator
Geoffrey Roberts book "Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953" offers a new look at the dictator's wars of aggression and defense.The scope of this book is unique in that it begins with the Finnish war and ends with Stalin's death as the Cold War was heating up.The strength of this book is the author's presentation of Stalin's actions within these important eras.As Stalin was the absolute master of the Soviet Union it is difficult to imagine Soviet history playing out the same without him.The chapters on the Second World War are very well done and informative, as are for the most part those on Stalin's foreign policy in the early Cold War.The book does tend to run out of steam toward the end, lacking as it does the desperate contingency of the war against Hitler.Also, the reader would have enjoyed more on the Finnish war.The episode, all too commonly, is dealt with as merely a prelude to the "Great Patriotic War".The Russo Finnish War, 1939-40, deserves greater attention in works of this kind, as it shows Stalin at his most devious, aggressive, and impotent.This is a good book that students of the Eastern Front or early Cold War should definitely check out.

A book on Stalin you should not miss
There are many history books on Stalin. This is one of them that you should not miss. It differs from many traditional opinions about Stalin. Stalin has always been portrayed as a ruthless dictator, cold war instigator and warmonger. Because of the opening of the Sovietarchives in the last 15 years, the author was able to look at history from a different perspective. In this book, Stalin is depicted as one of the greatest military leaders during the Second World War. Approximately 60% of the book is devoted to Stalin's leadership during the Second World War. There is without any doubt that the Russian Great Patriot War could not have won without the leadership of Stalin.Hitler showed great admiration of him as a military leader. On the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, Hitler confidedJoseph Goebbel: "Compared with Churchill, Stalin is a gigantic figure........ Churchill has nothing to show for his life's work except a few books and clever speeches."

The rest of the book deals with Stalin's role in the cold war and his foreign policy. The author concluded that after the Second World War, Stalin tried hard to maintain the Grand Alliance with Great Britain and the US and world peace. The cold war started when Truman invited Churchill to his home state Missouri and Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech. The book also concluded that Churchill and Truman were also responsible for the cold war. As the author puts it "Chruchill and Truman were unable to see that beyond the alleged communist threat was an opportunity to arrive at a postwar settlement that could have averted the cold war and avoided the ideological warfare that obscured the paradoxical truth that Stalin was the dictator who defeated Hitler and helped to save the world for democracy"

History can be a just court. Nobody will dispute that millions died because of Stalin. We should never forget that Stalin is a great military leader. Without the Russian, it might take a much longer time to defeat Hitler. Stalin had also tried hard to make peace with the West.

The reason I give a 4-star rating is because there are a few spots in the book that are a little bit slow. However, I enjoy this book enormously.

A contemporaneous Stalin
This book is marketed as a "provocative reassessment" of Stalin's military and political leadership during and after WWII. While "provocative" may overstate the case, this is indeed an excellent new history of WWII as seen through the prism of Josef Stalin.

The blow-by-blow accounts of Big Three summits provide enough detail and background to be interesting but not tedious, offering fascinating insights into the personalities of Truman, Churchill and Roosevelt, especially vis-a-vis Stalin. And there are well-documented and reasoned assessments of everything from the Katyn massacre, to the defense of Moscow, to the victory at Stalingrad. Roberts is masterfully judicious in his choice of which documents, telegrams, correspondence or first-hand accounts to present, always seeming to come up with some perfect morsel over which others have glossed.

In the end, Roberts comes to the conclusion that the correct image of Stalin is not one filtered over the decades, through Khrushchev et al, but rather one more in line with the contemporaneous view of the dictator during his lifetime - as a military leader who deserved praise for the unparalleled achievement of winning the Great Patriotic War: "To make so many mistakes and to rise from the depths of such defeat to go on to win the greatest military victory in history was a triumph beyond compare."(Reviewed in Russian Life)

A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT
Little by little we learn more about the war in the East in WWII. Until the Russians opened their archives to Western historians, most of the events were described through the eyes of German generals who had their own axes to grind. This remarkable volume by an Irish scholar attempts to see the victory through the mind of Stalin. If there are any diaries or other personal memoirs by Stalin, they are still closed to the West. What the author gives us is Stalin's thinking through examination of his daily calender, review of what he said to his colleagues and others such as ambassadors, etc as they reported it, and an analysis of his messages and letters.
He also introduces another aspect of the early defeat of the Soviet forces. He states the Soviet thinking was confined to offense, and it was unprepared to take on major defense as a strategy in the initial stages. There is support for this analysis in Fugate & Dovoretsky's volume, Thunder on the Dnepr. They mention a top secret war game (the third) whose documentation is still closed to the West which gave the Soviets confidence they could defeat the Germans through defense in depth.
Despite his claims, Mannstein was not the originator of the tactical implementation of this strategy.
Citino's book, the German Way of War, reinforces the knowledge that the superiority of German general officers lay in their unquestioned competence in operational matters. Their great weakness was the inability to grasp the strategic implications of their operations. Here, the author points out was one of Stalin's great strengths. Even in 1943, before the great battle of Kursk, he was already thinking about post war implications.
Perrett' book, Knights of the Black Cross, describes how the Germans stripped a regiment out of each panzer division to build enough divisions for the attack on Russia. It built a fundamental weakness into the plan. Now we have Tooze's new book describing, among other things, the inherent industrial weakness of Germany fortelling the ultimate failure of the attack. Thomas Childer's Teaching Company lectures, WWII: A Military and Social History, describes how the German infantry officers encountered a different war than the panzer divisions. Overcoming Russian resistance in the encircled forces was far more difficult than contemplated.
Roberts doesn't blink at the odious consequences of Stalin's torment of the Soviet people, nor does he attempt to coat over it. It's not the purpose of his volume to go over ground that is well-known. He gives the reader insight into how the man managed the Soviet victory. He joins in creating a useable picture for students of WWII of what the man was like in conducting his affairs. His discussion of Stalin's remarkable intelligence supports the narration in Hasegawa's Racing the Enemy. Stalin's grasp of Russian history, his understanding of his armed forces and the thrust of how to conduct the war are awesome. The author points out Stalin's mistakes as well as his success. Regardless of the other sides of the man, as one reviewer emphasized, his place in this area of WWII history continues to grow.
I recommend this volume to any serious student of WWII as well as those curious about how Stalin operated on a day-to-day basis during this slice of his life. The Cold War Years portion of the book were not as interesting to me. Perhaps that era needs more time for history to digest it as well as there may be more archival releases on both sides to give us a balanced view.
This volume belongs in any library that claims to have a military history section as well as the libraries of those who wish to have a better understanding of the events of WWII or how Soviet leadership operated. It will be an important reference work for many years to come. ... Read more

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Moving beyond the usual good-versus-evil story that pits master-planner Robert Moses against the plucky neighborhood advocate Jane Jacobs, Samuel Zipp sheds new light on the rise and fall of New York's urban renewal in the decades after World War II. Focusing on four iconic "Manhattan projects"--the United Nations building, Stuyvesant Town, Lincoln Center, and the great swaths of public housing in East Harlem--Zipp unearths a host of forgotten stories and characters that flesh out the conventional history of urban renewal. He shows how boosters hoped to make Manhattan the capital of modernity and a symbol of American power, but even as the builders executed their plans, a chorus of critics revealed the dark side of those Cold War visions, attacking urban renewal for perpetuating deindustrialization, racial segregation, and class division; for uprooting thousands, and for implanting a new, alienating cityscape. Cold War-era urban renewal was not merely a failed planning ideal, Zipp concludes, but also a crucial phase in the transformation of New York into both a world city and one mired in urban crisis. ... Read more

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This unique text provides a balanced, integrated, and comprehensive survey of the main events and developments in the Cold War as viewed from a global perspective. Coverage traces the Cold War from its roots in East-West tensions before and during World War II through its origins in the immediate postwar era, up to and including the collapse of the Soviet Union during 1989-1991. It also includes a comprehensive collection of more than 100 carefully edited documents (speeches, treaties, statements, and articles), making the great events of the era come alive through the words and phrases of those who were actively involved. ... Read more

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A Hard and Bitter Peace
A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War is an extremely well written book. If you don't have the opportunity of having Dr. Judge and Dr. Langdon as a professor A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War is the next best thing.

The Cold War
John Langdon and Edward Judge have captured the essence of the Cold War in this fine book.Useful for historians, teachers, students and anyone interested in a global perspective on the forty years following World War II, A Hard and Bitter Peace is truly remarkable! ... Read more

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On September 4, 1995, three American servicemen abductedand raped a twelve-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa.The reaction tothat rape throughout Japan and around the world mobilized otherwiseinattentive people to the persistence of Cold War-type relationshipsin East Asia-- particularly to the presence of 100,000 Americantroops-- and started to end the artificial distinction betweeneconomics and security in relations between the United States and itstrading partners in East Asia. It also caused some observers to beginto see Okinawa not simply as Japan's poorest prefecture but also as anAmerican colony located on Japanese soil.

Okinawa and its role in the Cold War is hidden history for mostAmericans and Japanese.It was the scene of the last and bloodiestbattle of World War II and was occupied by the American military until1972. Since then it has remained the site of some 39 American militarybases located in close proximity to the 1.29 million people ofOkinawa.

This book offers a pioneering selection of essays on the Battle ofOkinawa, forced emigration of Okinawans to Bolivia, Okinawan identity,the rape incident and the rekindling of Okinawan protest against thebases, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, economic development inOkinawa, the environmental degradation of Okinawa, and the Clintonadministration's deceptive promises to the Okinawans. Authors includeformer governor of Okinawa prefecture Masahide Ota, the editor of TheRyukyuanist Koji Taira, the pioneer writer on Okinawans in BoliviaKozy K. Amemiya, one of the founders of Okinawa Women Act AgainstMilitary Violence Carolyn Bowen Francis, the leading American scholarof Okinawan literature Steve Rabson, journalists Mike Millard, ShunjiTaoka, and Patrick Smith, and professors Gavan McCormack, MasayukiSasaki, and Chalmers Johnson. ... Read more

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Highly Recommend
I highly recommend this book. Chalmers Johnson and others put this book together well...excellent info. ... Read more

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A sobering assessment of American foreign policy from the end of the Vietnam era to Ronald Reagan.

With the same uncompromising style that characterized his breakthrough, Vietnam-era writings, Toward a New Cold War extends Chomsky's critique of US foreign policy through the early 1970s to Ronald Reagan's first term. Expanding on themes such as the cozy relationship of intellectuals to the state, and American adventurism after World War II, Chomsky goes on to exaamine the way that US policymakers set about the task of rewriting the horrible history of involvement in Indochina and turned their attention more squarely on the Middle East and Central America. He assesses US oil strategy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dissects the first volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, issues an urgent call to stem the bloodshed in then-unknown East Timor and, in the title essay, marks the increased posture of confrontation and rearmament under presidents Carter and Reagan that signaled the end of détente with the Soviet Union.

Featuring a new introduction by internationally acclaimed journalist John Pilger, this is the latest in the New Press series of Noam Chomsky's early political works. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Very strong alternative views but there are ethical assumptions underlying the book that affect the evidence and presentation.
I am not sure why one reviewer thought this was a Soviet apologist. This book argues that America, and Russia, interceded in essentially indigenous conflicts for non-ideological reasons. Business interests are the main culprit, so Chomsky says, though this book is not about tracing the strategies of specific corporations. There is bias however. As a typical example, the sections dealing with Israel in 1956-76 fails to properly credit participation from external forces; France and Britain are marginalized in the book and Russia is a rare mention. Accordingly, the business motivation thesis is not balanced against other motivations such as fear of Communism, or a desire for a stable world order that benefits America.

This book, however, is still worth getting for its examination of American intellectuals and for its corrections against mainstream notions that today are taken for granted. And unlike many authors, Chomsky does not hide his bias and his underlying moralities are honestly expressed.

By the way, this is a heavily annotated book so even if you disagree with him you will be able to disagree substantively.

A different prospective
This book gives alternative interpretation of causes and effects of US foreign policy in contrast to a popular held view. Author's research in general is very thorough and in many cases followed up first hand. Nonetheless the arguments are not constructed in a way to "convince a non believer" or to refute popular view point by point. The arguments are constructed to present author's view with ample references to start you off on verifying his facts on your own if you wish to do so. Paraphrasing author, he does not tend to convince, but rather help open up reader's mind to alternate possibilities in contrast to populist opinions.

With regard to the contents of the book, I have to say, it is critical of US foreign policy to say the least. He is far from being "an apologist for communist regimes" as his harshest critics attribute to him. Rather he holds a view that means that US uses to achieve its foreign policy goals could be much less violent and considerate of foreign country?s population?s will. He also exposes and questions the moral validity of certain US goals that are not commonly in a public view.

An outdated collection of essays
When I picked this up I thought it was a book explaining how America's war on terror was bringing it into a `new cold war' with Islam.Unfortunately that was not the case.This book is a collection of essays from times gone by, from the greatest of the critique's, Mr. Chomsky.This book details a myriad of subjects, boldly among them the steamship like memorandum on why Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan were creating a `new cold war.'The essay was written in the 80s.Days after the essay was written the Soviet Union collapsed and the cold war ended, forever.That fact alone should doom this book to obscurity but the other essays are more fascinating, including the interest in East Timor, which would not grace the American media for more then a decade and other essays on a vast array of Subjects.An interesting volume but the work is heavily outdated.For a soldier of Chomskyism this book will be another wind in the willows to add to the library and it is a must buy, in fact it will make a wonderful gift for any Chomsky lover.For those interested in Chomsky's take on the current geopolitical struggle, this book will be very disappointing.

US foreign policy in the 1970s
This is a reprint of a book from 1982. It's a collection of essays and articles dating from 1973 to 1981. After a lengthy introduction (which could be published as a short book all by itself), Chomsky uses the first four chapters to examine the way the media covers up US imperialism. Picking up after his famous essay, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals," he examines the complicity of journalists, editorialists, and other writers in making excuses for a murderous foreign policy. His remarks mention dozens of specific cases, naming names and quoting their morally repugnant words. You'll either laugh or cry when you see how war crimes such as the bombing of Cambodia were "explained" by the most prestigious writers in the country.

But his focus is also generalized --- he compares these peopleto the commisars of the Soviet Union, showing that in any country (democratic or otherwise), serving state policy is the only way to rise to the top. After reading the first four chapters, you'll feel a sense of recognition. I guess we always suspected that this is how the media *really* works.

Chapter 5 is co-authored with Edward S. Herman. Herman is the principal author of one of Chomsky's best-known books, Manufacturing Consent. (They teamed up together in 1979 to write The Political Economy of Human Rights, in two volumes. He's written a few important books himself, including The Real Terror Network.) This chapter continues in the vein of the first four, concentrating on the way the media and scholars rewrote the history of the Vietnam war. As with the previous chapters, dozens of specific examples are given, creating a broad picture of modern propaganda techniques.

From there, Chomsky goes on to review Henry Kissinger's memoirs, conflict in the Middle East, the role of the US in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (finally) a brilliant chapter on East Timor (written after the Indonesian invasion was in full swing).

I urge you to read this book. It paints a detailed portrait of consistency in US foreign policy. Intellectuals will insist that each invasion of each country is a unique moment in history, but Chomsky's meticuluous study shows the common threads. This book can be overwhelming at times in its endless parade of facts, but the effect is liberating. When you're done reading it, you'll feel that some light has been shed on what's really going on in the world. ... Read more

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